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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
In Ukraine, the question of reforming the PIT system has been long in the focus of an intense dis-
cussion. The Ukrainian tax system inheriting many problems, typical for all post-Soviet countries, 
created a lot of incentives and opportunities for substantial tax evasion, and, therefore, was bound to 
fail as a meaningful tax policy instrument.  
The PIT system has been reformed several times during the period of independence, but most of 
changes were introduced in 2003: tax base broadened, the tax rate structure simplified, and tax bur-
den reduced — the progressive tax rate of 0–40% was replaced with a flat 13% rate. The major pur-
pose, the reform is called to serve, is de-shadowing personal income resulting in increased PIT 
revenues as well as improving tax administration. The main assumption behind the reform design is 
that the low and non-progressive tax rate would encourage individuals to report a bigger share of 
their income. Thus, de-shadowing and broadening of the tax base were expected to compensate for 
the significant cut in the tax rate. These considerations were based on the successful experience of 
other transition countries, in particular Russia.  
However, despite quite significant increase in real personal income, PIT revenues experienced a con-
siderable slump in Ukraine in 2004 with a slight improvement in 2005. Thus, even if there is some de-
shadowing effect due to the tax reform, tax base broadening did not compensate for the cut in the tax 
rate. Now it is obvious that a cut-and-paste policymaking model has its serious drawbacks. 
The unsuccessful policy experiment called for a detailed empirical research at micro data level. In 
the framework of the research, a methodology was developed, relevant to personal-income tax re-
sponse analysis in the Ukrainian context. The research approach adopted involves constructing 
theoretical general equilibrium model adapted to practices in the Ukrainian economy. Empirical 
testing of the hypotheses on the firm-level data that follows revealed the reform effects and con-
firmed adequacy of the theoretical model and validity of the assumptions adapted.  
Both analytical solution of the theoretical model and econometrician testing do not reveal any sig-
nificant de-shadowing effect of the PIT reform. This means that the reform did not stimulate any 
tangible structural changes in the economy. However, according to empirical investigations, private 
firms and firms with labour-intensive technology, such as services and trading, demonstrated a bit 
higher increase in official wages in a response to the change in the PIT rate than others. 
Also, we conclude that a decreased effective PIT rate provoked a considerable fall in PIT payments. 
In particular, this effect is larger for firms, which have no evidence for de-shadowing. However, big 
firms, in comparison with small firms, have a more pronouncing de-shadowing effect and simulta-
neously a larger fall in PIT payments. It appears that lower marginal PIT rate can be more signifi-
cant for big firms, that traditionally hire high-skilled labour with relatively higher level of salary. At 
the same time, the effective PIT rate became much lower for them after the reform, so their PIT 
payments decreased at the more extent than small firms' payments. 
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Therefore, the government's income in a form of PIT revenues was redistributed to firms after the 
reform, which allowed firms to pay higher net wages to their employees. Those firms, which have 
more considerable reduction in their PIT payments, increased a net wage rate to the more extent. 
The weak effect of the reform is predetermined by conditions of the dominating labour demand 
channel, formalizes in the analytical model, when employers' decisions are strictly bounded by their 
costs structure, and employees' influence in negotiating labour contracts is minimized. In such con-
ditions, the PIT system reform should be accompanied with structural reforms in the social security 
system, the pension system, and labour market regulations. 
The results we obtained from the analytical model enable us to make the conclusion that within the 
framework of existing structural ties in the economy it is possible to increase compliance by intro-
ducing a more severe punishment for evasion. This is expected to be beneficial both for budget 
revenues and general economic development of the country. The existing tax rate is close to optimal 
and under the present conditions no other rate is expected to bring significantly better results. 
Under the results of the study the expected punishment and the low perceived probability of being 
caught evading are too low, which stipulates for the low observed tax compliance. The findings of 
the model show that audit efforts must be intensified by about 3-fold with tax rate kept unchanged. 
Further improvements to the system, besides intensification of audit efforts, should be the subject of 
further research. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The personal income tax is traditionally a major source of the budget revenue accounting for almost 
25% of all tax revenues (Table 1). PIT revenues demonstrated stable up-ward growth at accelerating 
pace since 1993. But, at the same time, more than 90% of PIT revenues came from employees' 
wages, and about 95% of PIT revenues came from taxpayers with less than UAH 400 monthly in-
come.1 These facts indicated serious problems of PIT system, more disturbing of which are large 
shadow sector and poor income redistribution in the society.  
Table 1. Personal income tax revenues 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 
PIT revenues 8774.9 10823.9 13521.3 13213.3 
Rate of change, % to previous period +37.6 +23.3 +24.9 –2.3 
Share of all tax revenues, % 23.9 23.8 24.9 20.9 
Share of GDP, % 4.3 4.8 5.1 3.8 
Source: Finance of Ukraine No. 10, p. 38 (2005). 
Before 2004, the PIT system of Ukraine was characterized by a progressive structure of tax rates, 
different tax burden on income from different sources, and numerous exemptions and privileges, 
which narrowed the tax base. Thus, income from primary employment was taxed at 10–40% rate, 
while income from the secondary employment — at 20% rate, and royalties — at 20–60% rate.2 
This rather high tax burden combined with weak tax administration is believed to contributed to 
massive tax evasion.3 Since 1991, the PIT system was reformed several times (app.2) but no prob-
lem solving changes were introduced.  
The 2003 PIT reform stipulated for (i) abolishing many exemptions and privileged group of taxpay-
ers and (ii) instituting the flat tax rate of 13%. The process of tax reforming is followed by a lot of 
dispute. Official expert estimates pointed losses for the consolidated budget from introduction of the 
new tax system in the amount of UAH 4 to 5 billion. But the changes introduced were supposed to 
bring some part on the huge unofficial sector out of the shadow. Policy-makers believed that this 
decrease in the tax burden encouraged taxpayers to declare more income, in particular, high income. 
                                                 
1 IER Advisory paper.  
2 IER Advisory paper. 
3 According to the (2003) joint research "Trends of the Shadow Economy in Ukraine" (on the report, see Калугин, 
2003) by the Ministry of Economy and European Integration of Ukraine and the World Bank the size of the shadow 
sector in Ukraine was 41.08% of the official GDP (down from 65.77% in 1997). 
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Indeed, the tax rate of 13% considerably reduced total labour expenses if a wage rate is compara-
tively high, as we can see at Fig. 1. 
Net wage, UAN
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Fig. 1. Comparison of 2003 and 2004 taxation burden paid over net wage4 
In so, the government expected quite significant personal income de-shadowing as a result of the 
reform, which might compensate for the PIT revenues fall due to the tax rate cut. Apart from that, 
the broader PIT base was supposed to contribute to PIT revenues as well. Unfortunately, presump-
tions of the reform appeared to be not true. The PIT revenues fell for the first time since 1993 
(Fig. 1), and the share of PIT revenues in all taxes also fell (Table 1). Moreover, the broadened defi-
nition of the PIT base did not contribute much to the PIT revenues. The PIT revenues from addi-
tional income sources, introduced for taxation, were not significant, and wages remained the major 
source of the PIT revenues (Fig. 2). 
Now, it is becoming obvious that just reducing tax burden, even so significant, is not a panacea for 
PIT evasion and may lead to financial instability in the short-run. To develop a more meaningful 
PIT policy, the nature of PIT evasion should be studied more carefully. 
The objectives of the study are the following: 
1. Researching into the consequences of the tax cut introduced: how it affected the behaviour of 
economic agents and the size of the shadow sector of the economy. The focus of the study is 
                                                 
4 Source: Own calculations. 
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revealing peculiarities of or tax evasion behaviour in terms of Ukraine, so researching into the 
ties and factors, determining the scale of the shadow sector in Ukraine, and revealing how 
changes of the parameters of the economic system can affect the incompliance behaviour and 
so the size of the underground economy. 
2. Evaluating redistribution of welfare among the classes of economic agents (employers, em-
ployees, and the government) as a result of the tax reform introduction. 
3. On the basis of investigation of the ties and effects above, developing policy recommendations 
for further reforming the PIT system in Ukraine and introducing the policy capable of effi-
ciently affecting tax evasion. 
4. In the framework of the research, we develop a general methodology, relevant to personal-
income tax response analysis in the Ukrainian context. Besides, the tax reform under way in 
Ukraine in a way is a natural experiment. This provides a theoretical interest and gives a good 
ground for researching the behavioural effects of these changes. 
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Fig. 2. Components of the PIT revenues5  
1.1. Hypotheses 
1. The low flat tax rate on personal income lead to increasing declared labour income (both wage 
rate and registered jobs). The substantially lower PIT rate stimulates employers to report a 
bigger part of actually paid wages without increasing their expenditures on labour.  
2. Introducing the low flat tax rate on personal income lead to decreasing PIT revenues. PIT 
revenues may decrease considerably since the amount of de-shadowing labour income may ap-
                                                 
5 Source: Finance of Ukraine No. 10, p. 38 (2005). 
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pear not enough to compensate for the cut in the tax rate. The primary goal of the tax reform is 
to transmit a part of the labour income out of the shadow increasing the base for PIT subtrac-
tions. Still, a certain decrease in PIT revenues is expected since the new PIT rate is lower than 
the former effective PIT rate (15%). 
3. Income is redistributed from the government to employers as a result of the tax reform. Still the 
actual employees' income is the paid wage agreed on by employer and employee preliminary. 
Cutting in PIT rate allows the employer to reduce expenditures even if they decide to report a 
bigger part of the wage paid. 
1.2. Research strategy 
The research approach adopted involves constructing theoretical general equilibrium model adapted 
to practices in the Ukrainian economy. Solving the model analytically shows how the structural pe-
culiarities put into the assumptions of the models condition the consequences on the tax reform un-
der investigation. This allows a preliminary analytical testing of the hypotheses formulated. Empiri-
cal testing of the hypotheses on the firm-level data that follows reveals actual effects of the reform 
and confirms adequacy of the theoretical model and validity of the assumptions adapted. 
The theoretical model developed consists of two parts: short run and long run. As far as hy-
potheses formulated refer to only short-run consequences of the reform introduced, testing them 
is provided within the simplified short-run model, as well as in the empirical part. Long-run 
model allows finding equilibrium path of tax and fine rates, share of reported wage and other 
state and policy variables for the players involved: the government, the firm, and the tax officer. 
The long-run model results hold under the condition of invariable structural ties and practices in 
the economy. 
2. REVIEW OF CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In theory, taxes levied on personal incomes induce individuals to respond in two ways. First of them 
is to seek different consumption bundles or to adjust their working hours. However, this substitution 
response, as suggested by Slemrod (1998), is not sensitive to tax rate changes. More often, people 
undertake a variety of tax planning schemes and other manipulations, whose goal is to reduce tax 
liability without changing consumption. Tax avoidance techniques6 or substituting away to untaxed 
activities, leisure or household production,7 are legal forms of reducing tax liabilities; while tax eva-
sion and activities in the underground economy are subject to detection and punishment by the gov-
ernment. Generally, each of these behavioural forms is typically perceived by economists as a ra-
tional response of an individual maximising their income or consumption. 
                                                 
6 for a detailed examination see Slemrod (1998). 
7 for interesting explanations see Davis and Henrekson (2004). 
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The choice to evade taxes, completely or partially, is usually modelled in the theory as comparing 
benefits from the underreporting taxable income with costs of risks and penalties if detected. The 
basic theoretical model explaining tax evasion is a straightforward application of a rational indi-
vidual's choice under uncertainty, first described by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Since that 
time, the theoretical framework of tax evasion has developed into a two-sector model incorporat-
ing the conventional labour-supply theory; and then — into the general equilibrium model with 
production, markets, and many interacting participants. The latter refers to the study of the under-
ground economy. 
The turning point in tax evasion discussions was Clotfelter (1983) conclusion that the opportunity to 
evade taxes depends on the source of income (capital income, a salaried position in a corporation, 
self-employment). Since decisions on income concealment are closely related to labour market 
choices, the tax evasion decisions are studied in the conventional framework of labour-supply models.  
But the labour-supply choice alone cannot be determinative for the allocation of labour between the 
formal and informal sectors — demand for labour is expected to matter as well. Intuitively, taxes 
levied on labour income create a gap between gross wages paid by employers and net wages re-
ceived by employees; with higher tax rates this gap may become large enough to induce both of 
them to participate in the underground.  
The traditional framework of the general equilibrium model involves, on the one side, labour force 
participants looking for jobs, and, on the other side, productive firms looking for employees. A po-
tential employee makes a decision to supply their labour services at one of the markets comparing 
the net marginal return on their work in both sectors maximising their expected income. Too high 
tax rate on labour income makes the net return on an individual's work efforts in the official sector 
unsatisfactorily low and induces them to look for higher return by evading taxes in the informal sec-
tor. On the other hand, the employer makes the decision to propose a job at one of the two markets 
depending on the net marginal return from a labour unit in both sectors. The expenses on a labour 
unit consist of official wage rate and payroll tax in the formal sector; while in the informal sector, 
— of unofficial wage rate and expected penalty for the unregistered job. So, increasing payroll tax 
may drive up the labour expenses to some critical level, after which they overweight the return from 
labour. To minimise the costs firms are induced either to hire less labour or to hire labour infor-
mally to escape paying taxes. Both the employer and the employee meet in either formal or infor-
mal labour market, where wages are established as a result of both sides interacting under the condi-
tion of markets clearing.  
According to empirical observations, provided by Clotfelter (1983), Kesselman (1989), Henrekson 
(2004) and many others, the tax policy effects are hinged on the production technology in a certain 
industry and influence considerably the scale of underground businesses, their mode of operation, 
and, again, their production technologies. This stresses the importance of the demand channel ef-
fects of personal income taxes on the underground economy. Correspondingly, labour demand re-
sponses to changes in policy instruments; while labour supply adjusts to the new equilibrium. The 
magnitudes of responses and adjustment are represented by labour supply-demand elasticities. 
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The theory, described by Davis and Henrekson (2004), identifies characteristics of production tech-
nologies and factor input that lead to high or low tax responsiveness. Key factor here is how access 
to capital markets and scale of economy that may be enjoined only in the formal sector are determi-
native for productivity of the enterprise accordingly to its technology. Firms, operating informally, 
have a limited access to the means of contract enforcement, so they are constrained in borrowing 
from capital markets. Consequently, these firms choose to enter formal sector when their return on 
outside financing exceeds the additional tax costs they must bear. Besides, informal firms must re-
strict the size of their operations to minimise the chance to be discovered. Similarly, those firms that 
can enjoy the economies of scale effect in their production rather prefer the formal sector. There-
fore, we can characterise the firms relatively insensitive to tax changes as the ones with capital-
intensive production technology or/and with large establishment.  
According to Amaral and Quintin (2003), in the equilibrium, participants of the underground tend to 
be more productive in those occupations or industries that are more amenable to tax evasion. In-
creasing tax rates on the labour income induces primarily firms with labour-intensive technology to 
switch to the underground, and enhances their demand for low-skilled labour. 
In the context of this study a special interest for Ukrainian researchers and policy-makers lies in the 
results of research on the Russian tax reform. 
The major assumption providing the ground for both Russian and Ukrainian reforms is that the tax 
burden is too heavy, therefore, the major stimulus for tax evasion is high tax rates,. Besides, the 
progressive tax rate was recognised to fail in fair income redistribution in the society.  Thus, the in-
stituted flat rate is expected to encourage de-shadowing firstly high income, that is expected to im-
prove PIT revenues and simultaneously to restore social fairness. 
Russian reform is generally regarded as a successful one as its introduction led to a slight rise in PIT 
revenues. Russian reform was investigated in a number of research papers, such as Sinelnikov and 
Moreliov (2003) and Vasilyeva and Gurvich (2003). Researchers of the Russian tax reform gener-
ally performed their study applying models on aggregated macro data. 
The main objective of researches on the Russian reform was to establish a connection between the 
tax rate and the tax base (detecting the de-shadowing effect of the reform) and between the tax rate 
and the tax revenues (detecting whether the tax base could compensate for the tax rate reduction). 
Sinelnikov and Moreliov (2003) tested the corresponding hypotheses on highly aggregated data 
across regions of Russia. They found a significant, but small positive effect of the tax rate cut on tax 
revenues and the tax base. Still, the connection found is likely to be interpreted as a correlation be-
tween indicators since factors of PIT revenues, PIT base, and PIT rate were just regressed one 
against the other, which is not sufficient to reveal any causal ties. Thus, the effects could have been 
caused by other factors in the economy and just happened in the same time. Unfortunately, no other 
factors were analysed in the study. 
In the contrast, Vasilyeva and Gurvich (2003) provided a detailed analysis of all possible tax re-
form effects and considered a number of economic factors, which could appear to cause the PIT 
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base extension altogether with the PIT revenues. Authors considered in their analysis such factors 
as the economic growth in the country, increased demand for labour, increased labour productiv-
ity, de-shadowing, indirect influence of other tax changes and others. They estimated the 
weighted contribution of each factor to the increase of the average wage rate with the production 
function model of the general Cobb–Douglass presentation. In conclusion, the increase in official 
wages by 3.2% of GDP was explained by the following factors: decreasing in turnover taxes 
(0.4%), decreasing in social tax (1.3%), de-shadowing wages (0.7%), structural economic factors 
(0.9%). Thus, the main factor of increasing PIT revenues in Russia is recognized to be the simul-
taneous reforms of other important taxes such as the enterprise profit tax, turnover tax and social 
tax. Also, authors claimed that no proof could be found that the effect of de-shadowing was pro-
voked by the cut in the PIT rate. 
Refereeing to the same argumentation, IER experts8 state that Ukrainian and Russian reforms can-
not be compared. In the analysis, IER pointed out that sharp cut in the tax rate would rather lead to a 
significant decrease in the revenues and financial instability since the before-reform effective tax 
rate is actually higher than proposed one. They highlighted that transparency and simplicity of leg-
islation norm, exemptions, doubtful definitions and privileges, are more preferable tools for tax base 
widening. Anyway, cut of tax rate should be implemented gradually, step-by-step, to control finan-
cial stability. 
ICPS experts9 analysed the problem in the general context of the whole economy. They highlighted 
the role of tax legislation predictability, share of social tax in total labour expenses, corruption, legal 
norms regulating business, development of financial markets, and satisfactory public services. They 
state that the problem could be solved as a result of the structural reforms improving the general 
balance of advantages of participating in the official economy in comparison to the benefits from 
tax evasion activities. 
Leading analytical institutions mentioned high tax burden, in particular marginal tax rate, but all of 
them do not as the most important factor of PIT evasion. Other factors, in the first stage, tax legisla-
tion, tax administration, definitions of the tax base and tax payers. These conclusions coincide with 
those made by IMR experts10 that tax evasion behaviour is not sensitive to tax rate changes in the 
transition country because of more serious structural problems in the economy. 
We agree with the point that informality is an outcome of non-trivial interactions between various 
kinds of institutions (fiscal institutions, labour markets). And to trace and distinguish between ef-
fects of various factors in researching we need to apply the general equilibrium structural model. 
Only through a thorough understanding of all these interactions, a government can choose an effec-
tive way leading to any considerable reduction in the scale of the shadow sector of the economy. 
                                                 
8 IER (Institute of Economic Research, Kyiv) Working Paper (2002). 
9 ICPS (International Center for Policy Studies) Analytical Note (2003). 
10 Stepanyan (2003). 
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3. DATA SPECIFICATION 
The micro data necessary for the analysis can be found in financial reports (income statement and 
balance sheet), and statistical forms (Form Entrepreneurship) companies provide to local statistics 
offices. The data series obtained are listed in the Appendices A2 and A3. Appendix A4 presents de-
scriptive statistics for the data series. 
Micro data are costly and a special attention is paid to the process of retrieving the data from the 
database. Some companies do not have employees; others do not disclose the information on wage 
fund, and so on. In addition to the data cited, available can be also other variables from the forms 
noted above; also available can be international trade activities by the companies (volumes of ex-
ports-imports). 
Totally in Ukraine there were 935578 companies registered in 2003. Still, according to the SSC in-
formation, in 2003 there were 247413 actually operating companies (those submitting statistical, 
balance, and financial forms). So the representative number of companies in the sample was calcu-
lated on the basis of this figure with the following formula: 
 
2 2
2 2 2
ft Nn
N t
σ
σ= ∆ + , (1) 
where n is the sample size wanted, N = 247413 — the population of companies; 2σ  = 0.25 (maxi-
mum value); ∆ = 0.05; t = 2 (for P = 0.9545). f is the number of sub-samples which have to be rep-
resentative. Taking f = 3 we get the possibility t o analyze the data in three cuts: according to the 
industry, region, and form of ownership. 
For these figures the wanted value of n is at least 1198, and we take 1200. 
According to the Ukrainian law it is prohibited to disclose financial and other data of individual 
companies. So the statistics office can provide only information according to preliminary stated cri-
teria without names or individual numbers of companies. 
The criteria of representativity chosen were those of industry, region, and the form of ownership. 
The figures were calculated on the SSC report for the beginning of 2003 about the total number of 
the companies (registered) under the assumption of the proportion of really active companies to the 
total amount across all of the criteria listed in Appendix A2. 
Prior to the econometric analysis micro data for 2004 were deflated to be consistent with the price 
level of 2003 by the index of inflation. 
4. SHORT-RUN MODEL 
4.1. Developing the model 
The general assumption of the model is that firms operate both in the regular economy, as well, as 
in the shadow. Some of the employees are employed officially, and some of them are hidden labour. 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
14
In the framework of the model this is equivalent to all the workers being employed officially, with 
their wages reported only partly, which also corresponds to the real state of the economy. 
To build the model in the short run, it is possible to consider only the firm side. On the side of the 
firms, employers are assumed to be the only party responsible for paying taxes. The reasoning for 
the assumption is that in terms of Ukraine in transition, with the employer paying all the taxes and 
other charges calculated on top of the wage fund, with no deficit of labour force, and poorly devel-
oped labour and social insurance markets, the employee is interested in and bargains about only net 
wage they receive, which is assumed the only incentive for employment. We assume that the de-
mand channel strictly dominates in the market since the labour market is characterised by endoge-
nous skills and high unemployment costs. (Actually, it is true for many professional segments of 
labour market in Ukraine). So, we do not incorporate employees' problem into the model. The net 
wage is resulting from the demand-supply equilibrium and is exogenously set in this model. 
Under competition assumption, it would be plausible to treat enterprises as one agent. The firm 
chooses the proportion of its legal and shadow parts. 
The government collects taxes for public services (such as defence, road construction, etc, which 
are assumed to have no influence on the structure of the externally determined income of the firm) 
and for transfers to the poor (which are assumed to have no influence on the exogenously set net 
wage the employee gets paid). 
In this, the employer decides on the amount of the wage to report according to their belief of prob-
able response by the tax officer. The firm pays to its employees the net salary of W, but reports Wr, 
which takes the values of [0, W]. In normalised terms, it reports the wr part of it. wr takes only val-
ues of [0, 1]. The firm has also a set of believes of the probability of audit and audit efforts of the 
tax officer. The probability ρ is defined as depending on the following factors: 
• the fine rate of θ (positively: the higher the fine rate, the more auditing effort will be applied 
with tax officer potentially able to get more personal benefits form the audit); 
• the ratio of the net wage paid to the industry average net wage /rW W  ( inversely with 92% of 
fines by tax administration statistics is levied on the companies reporting less than their region in-
dustry average wage); 
• the ratio of the net wage paid to the minimum wage min/rW W  (inverse dependence with below 
minimum wage set be the parliament for the period reporters being almost necessarily audited); 
• the reported employees' salary of rw  (reflecting subjective feeling of guilt for the employer un-
derreporting employees' wages). 
• In so we get ρ as a subjective reflection of the tax officer's effort. In case the firm gets caught, it 
must pay the rest of the tax of )1( rwt −  and the fine of )1( rw−θ . 
Under these assumptions the firm's objective function looks in the following way: 
 min (( ) )
r
r r
w
T T Tρ+ × − +Θ , (2) 
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Here taxes paid on the wage fund are 
 )(WTT = , (3) 
the amount of tax to be paid is 
 )( rTT −Θ=Θ , (4) 
and the subjective probability (firm's beliefs) of being caught is 
 ),,,(
minW
W
W
Ww
rr
r θρρ = , (5) 
The assumptions of the functional form of the probability function look graphically in the following 
way (see Fig. 3): 
a) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
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⎛ −−−=⎟⎠
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⎛ 2111
W
W
W
W rrρ ; 
b) 
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⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+
=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
− 1
1
1
2
108.092.0
k
r
k
r
r
W
W
W
W
W
Wρ ,  
here ⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
>
≤=
WW
WW
k
r
r
,1
,0
1 , or, in programming terms, ( ))(1211 WWsignk r −−= ; 
c) ( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+= 1θ
θθρ ;  
d) 
2
minmin
k
rr
W
W
W
W
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ρ ,  
here 
⎩⎨
⎧
>
≤=
min
min
2 ,2
,0
WW
WW
k
r
r , or, in programming terms )(1 min2 WWsignk r −−= . 
With these assumptions on the functional form, the probability of being caught takes the following 
form: 
 
1
2
1
2
2
1
min
0.92 0.08 1
1 1 1
1
k
r
k
r r
k
r
W
W WW
W WW
W
θρ θ
−
−
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+ − ⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟= − − − × × ×⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ +⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎛ ⎞ ⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
. (6) 
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When incerting these formulas into the objective function we ultimately get: 
 
[
( )
1
1
2
2
2
1
min
0.92 0.08 1
min ( ) ( ) 1 1 1
... ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
r
k
r
r
r r r kW
r
k
r
r r r
W
W Wt W W b W
W W
W
W t W b W t W W b W
W
θ
−
−
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+ − ⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞ ⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟+ + − − − × ×⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞× × × × + − − ⎤⎜ ⎟ ⎦⎝ ⎠
 (7) 
s.t. 0,; ≥≤ rr WWWW . 
a) Probability of detection on reported wage 
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c) Probability of detection on penalty rate 
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Fig. 3. Assumptions on the functional form of the probability function 
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The model is built on the basis of the net wage received by the employee. So all the wages were re-
calculated into the net form (including minimum wage, industry average wage, etc). The taxation 
system (the amount of net taxes paid) in both 2003 and 2004 in Ukraine can be represented in the 
following functional form: 
 T t W b= × + , (8) 
where t  and b  have several different values depending on W, calculated from the PIT system (Ap-
pendix A1) and is presented in the table below: 
2003 
W ≤18 ≤77,38 ≤130,45 ≤145,35 ≤799,85 ≤1255,45 ≤1802,65 >1802,65 
t 0.3680 0.55455 0.64819 0.66829 0.77662 1.04179 1.40000 0.75439 
b 0.00000 –2.64273 –9.80675 –9.92634 –25.67221 –237.76657 –687.48000 476.33614 
 
2004 
W ≤154,185 ≤317,2665 ≤437,4135 ≤2233,203 >2233,203 
t 0.60450 0.62105 0.62944 0.62944 0.19111 
b –14.83043 –14.98332 –15.06095 0.00000 978.88 
A graph built on these data is displayed in Fig. 1. 
Concerning fines, they can be modelled in the following way: 
 ( ( ) ( ))rT W T WθΘ = × − . (9) 
According to the law of Ukraine "On the order of paying liabilities by taxpayers to budget and non-
budgetary special funds," dated December 21, 2000, companies caught evading taxes must pay the 
due payment, penalty, and interest on the payment and penalty. 
Before February 20, 2003 the amount of penalty was 200% and since the date — not more than 
50% of the discovered overdue payment. So we can assume the formal penalty system to be identi-
cal in the both years of 2003 and 2004. 
The interest is calculated as yearly 120% of the National Bank's rate (7% in 2003 and the average of 
7.417% in 2004). Legally allowed audit for a company by tax authorities cannot date further back 
than 3 years. This leads to the average interest of 12.6% for overdue payments originating in 2003 
and 13.31% for those from 2004. 
So from these data we obtain 626.0=θ  in 2003 and 633.0=θ  in 2004.  
These assumptions allow building a model for researching through the optimal response of firms to 
the taxation system set. The Matlab program for running estimation for the 2003 ('old') system, 
2004 ('new') system and objective realized as a separate function are given in the Appendix A2. the 
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calculations were done for a particular industry — Real estate operations, lessor activities, and ser-
vices for legal entities, growing in the average wage from UAH 526.81 (the net of 420.09) in 2003 
to UAH 666.77 (the net of UAH 559.79) in 2004. 
The minimum wage grew from UAH 185 in 2003 to the average of 215.67 in 2004, or from UAH 
156.90 to UAH 191.25 in the net terms. This is reflected in the simulation program. 
Numerical calculations produces )(** WWW rr = , from where it is possible to calculate and compare 
the optimal relative response  
W
Ww rr
*
* = . 
The results of estimation are reported in the charts below (see Figs 4, 5). 
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Fig. 4. Comparing the share of reported wage in 2003 and 2004 
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Fig. 5. Comparing the volumes of reported wage in 2003 and 2004 
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The figures show the behaviour the firm in 2003 and 2004 in comparison. Difference in the reported 
wage share is given in the Fig. 6. 
 
Net wage, UAN
0            500           1000         1500         2000
Reported wage share change 
0
–0.4
–0.8
0.4
0.8 2004 minus 2003 
 
Fig. 6. Difference in the reported wage share 2004–2003 
The figure shows that for the net wage under 1750 the 2003 system was no less efficient in collect-
ing taxes than the 2004 one. 
The numerical estimation shows that the reported wage share fluctuates around 28%. As far as the 
model covers those companies which are able to respond to the existing market conditions (make 
good use of the rules of the game) it would be plausible to assume that it is mostly private-owned 
companies that underreport wages. Considering that out of all employees in Ukraine in 2004, 47.2% 
worked for private companies and 52.8% — for state-owned and municipal companies and institu-
tions, and assuming that underreporting were private companies and public ones behaved in the le-
gal way, we ultimately get the reported wage share of 52.8% 47.2% 0.28 66%+ × = , which produces 
estimate of the shadow sector of the economy of 34%. This is consistent with joint estimates by the 
Ministry of Economy and the Word Bank of 35% in Ukraine in 2004. 
4.2. Testing hypotheses 
In this numerical model set-up it is possible to test the hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1. 
For the first hypothesis testing we can eliminate in the model the effect of the minor penalty system 
change, the growth of the minimum wage and also the effect of the industry average wage on the 
reported wage. From the assumption which was laid into the basis of the study that the employee is 
interested in the net wage only we can presume the employer paying the same net wage to the em-
ployee and test the hypothesis. 
The results of the simulation look in the following way (see Figs 7, 8). 
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Fig. 7. Results of testing Hypothesis 1 
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Fig. 8. Results of testing Hypothesis 1 
From the charts it is obvious that unless the net wage distribution is very much concentrated around 
UAH 600 (which is definitely not the case in the economy), the change in the tax itself did not 
cause any de-shadowing effect. 
This suggests the conclusion that decreasing taxes in itself cannot stir any de-shadowing. In this 
case with the penalty system unchanged, the firm can increase its wealth by reporting a smaller 
share of taxable expenses with presuming the same level of risk. 
When combined with the rest of changes in the economy, the ultimate effect can be calculated tak-
ing into consideration the distribution of wages. Taking the sub-sample of private ownership com-
panies from the data set at hand (810 companies in each year) and deriving the net wage series from 
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the wage fund, number of employees and the set of taxation system rules, we get the following net 
wage distribution in 2003–2004 (see Fig. 9). 
Net wage, UAN
25            525          1025         1525         2025 
Relative frequency 
0.1
0
2003 
0.2 
2004
 
0.3
 
Fig. 9. Net wage distribution for private companies 
Using the distribution as weights for the series or reported wage shares obtained as a result of the 
simulations, we get the average reported wage for 2003, which is 0.27, and the one for 2004, which 
is 0.31. From these data we estimate the contraction of the shadow sector from 2003 to 2004 to be 
about 1.7%. 
Hypothesis 2. 
Despite the fact that the average reported wage share grew and nominal wage grew considerably, 
this may not be enough to compensate for the losses that are incurred by the government when re-
ducing the effective PIT rate from about 15% to less than 13% (because of privileges remaining). 
To numerically estimate the effect we generate the series of governmental revenues (from the set of 
taxation rules) and use weights from the distribution (shown in the figure above). 
From these calculations we get average budget revenues from one employed person to be 29.11 in 
2003 and 30.29 in 2004. Discounted by the real wage index (5.7%) in 2004, the revenues of 30.29 
turn into 28.66 stipulating the loss in income of UAH 0.45 (in terms of 2003 money). So the hy-
pothesis holds. 
Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 3 holds under the model assumptions and the results above from testing hypotheses 1 
and 2 with UAH 0.45 being transferred per employee per month from the government to employers. 
Testing hypotheses on the theoretical model provided a preliminary result of absence of any consis-
tent proof of more incentives for firms to report taxes in the changing the tax rate alone. Also, the 
reform lead to falling real revenues from PIT collections with redistribution of income from the 
government to employers. 
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5. LONG-RUN MODEL 
5.1. Specifying the model 
In the long run, the modelled economy consists of three agents: government, the firm and the tax 
officer. 
Government's objective is to maximize social welfare, which is the total output Y . 
The government sets tax rates τ  and collects taxes and fines )( θ+T ; collected proceeds are used to 
produce a public good P  and are put back into the economy at a transaction cost of C : 
111 −−− −+= tttt CTP θ . Public good represents enforcing property rights and other services by the 
government available only to firms operating legally. It fully depreciates after one period. So, the 
Government's objective function is maximizing social welfare consisting in the sum of labour in-
come over reservation wage plus net income of companies (less necessary investments) less costs of 
running the economy: 
 ( )
{ , } 0
max ( ) ( (1 ) )
t t
t
t t t t t t t t t
t
L W Wres Y LW I Cτ θ β τ
∞
=
− + − + − −∑  (10) 
The firm is a representative agent of a big number of identical ones. The firm produces under the 
CRS neoclassical production function. The factors of production are technology shock A , labour 
input L , capital K , and public good P :  
γαγα −−= 1ttttt LKPAY . 
Technology shock tA  follows one-period Markov process pattern:  
A
ttt aAA ε+= −1 . 
Capital tK  wholly belongs to the firm and no rent is paid for using that. The firm invests a part of 
its profits in production:  
1 1(1 )t t tK K Iδ− −= − + . 
Public good is a factor of production invested by the government: 
111111111 )()( −−−−−−−−− −+−+= ttttrtttttrtt CLWWcLWP θττ . 
Labour and product markets clear exogenously. The assumption goes that labour is in sufficient 
supply in the market and search can be performed costless at any moment. The only tax in the mod-
elled economy is levied on labour income. The firm is fully responsible for paying these taxes. 
Firm is a representative of a big number of identical agents operating in the economy. Firm maxi-
mizes its value as a stream of its net income stream left after producing and paying labour expenses 
and taxes less capital investments necessary for production in the following periods. The firm pays 
wage W  but shows to the government only the a part of that rW  — reported wage. So the total ex-
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penses the firm is willing to pay are )( τrWW + . The firm expects a fine of the size of 
))(( θτ +− rWW  in case it is caught evading with the perceived probability of ρ . It is assumed that 
in case the firm is caught, all of the hidden part of wage )( rWW −  is revealed. So, the firm's objec-
tive function is: 
 ( )
{ , } 0
max ( )( )
r
t t
t r r
f t t t t t t t t t t t t k
W K t
Y LW LW LW LW Iβ τ ρ τ θ∞
=
− − − − + −∑ . (11) 
The tax officer targets at maximising proceeds from fines and extra payments to the state budget 
minus value of audit C . Value of audit is equal to the intensity of audit ]1,0[=c  times cost of unit 
of audit ψ : ttttt WLcC ψ= . The set audit effort to be identical with the probability of detection. So 
the tax officer has the following objective: 
 ( )max ( )( )
t
r c
t t t t t t t t tc
c W L W L Cτ θ ε+ − − ,  (12) 
where ctt
r
ttt LWLW ε)( −  is the officer's guess on the amount of hidden wage. cε  is an error term 
following log-normal pattern of ),0( 2cσ . To simplistically model the learning process, we assume  
2
1
2
−= tcct σςσ . 
In per capita per unit of wage terms, the economy incentive structure looks in the following way: 
Government:  
 
{ , } 0
max 1 ( 1 )
t t
t t
t t t t t
t t
Wres
E y i c
Wτ θ
β τ ψ∞
=
⎛ ⎞− + − − − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ . (13) 
Firm:  
 ( )
{ , } 0
max (1 )( )
r
t t
t r r
t t t t t t t t
w k t
E y w w iβ τ ρ τ θ∞
=
− − − + −∑ . (14) 
Tax officer:  
 ( )max ( )(1 )
t
r
t t t t t t tc
E c w cτ θ ε ψ+ − − . (15) 
Here  
γα
tttt kpAy = , ( ))(1 11 tttt
tt
t cvl
p θττ ++= −− , 
1−
=
t
t
t L
Ll , 
1−
=
t
t
t W
Wv , 
tt
t
t WL
Kk = , 
tt
r
tr
t WL
Ww = , 
2
( ) exp
2
c ct
tE
σε ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . 
The model has inbuilt the following incentive structure. The government is interested in rising the 
tax rate as long as additional increment will spur public welfare stream. The government is con-
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scious of both positive and distortion effects of taxation on private production. The firm's incentive 
structure may be split into short run and long run. In the short run, the firm is interested in hiding. 
Its one-period objective is identical to minimizing costs. The firm is unconscious about positive ef-
fect of taxation and it is small to affect taxes or creation of public good. In the long run, it is inter-
ested in optimising investments to achieve its maximum value. The tax officer optimizes efforts in 
order to reach maximum positive result of audit activities. 
5.2. Solving the model analytically 
Mixed strategies lead to the following equilibrium conditions: 
From tax officer's objective:  
( )21 ( )exp 0.5r tt t t tw
ψ
τ θ σ= − + . 
From company's objective of minimizing costs:  
tt
t
t θτ
τρ += . 
Applying the non-degenerate equilibrium condition, ttc ρ= . Further, it can be shown that  
ttt
r
tt
r
tt ww τθτρτ =+−+ ))(1( , ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−= −
−−
−
tt
tt
t
tt
t vl
p θτ
ψττ
1
11
1
1 . 
Eliminating the terms that are exogenous from the objective functions of corresponding agents, we 
get the following system of optimisation problems: 
Government:  
 ( )1 1 1{ , } 0max (1 )t t t t t t t t t t t t ttE A p k k k l v cα γτ θ β τ δ ψ
∞
+ + +
=
− + − − −∑ . (16) 
Firm:  
 ( )
1
1 1 1{ } 0
max (1 )
t
t
t t t t t t tk t
E A p k k k l vα γβ δ
+
∞
+ + +
=
+ − −∑ . (17) 
Solving the firm's optimisation, we get:  
0)1()( 111111 =−++− −+++++ δβγβ γα ttttt kpAEvl , 
from where  
γ
αγ
δβ
γβ −
+
−
++
+
+ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−=
1
1
1
1
11
1
1 )1(
)(
t
tt
t
t pvl
AEk , 
or, letting  
γ
δβ
γβϕ −
++
+
+ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−=
1
1
11
1
1 )1(
)(
tt
t
t vl
AE , 
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we get  
γ
α
ϕ −+++ = 1 111 ttt pk , 
which when plugged into the government's objective modifies it in the following way: 
 1 1 11 1 1 1{ , } 0
max (1 )
t t
t
t t t t t t t t t t t t
t
E A p p p l v c
α α α
γ γ γ γ
τ θ β ϕ τ ϕ δ ϕ ψ
∞
− − −
+ + + +
=
⎛ ⎞− + − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  (18) 
where  
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−= +++ tt
t
t
tt
t vl
p θτ
ττ
11
1
1 , and 
tt
t
tc θτ
τ
+= ; 
( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−= ++
+
2
11
1 11
tt
t
ttt
t
vld
dp
θτ
θ
τ , ( )211
1 1
tt
t
ttt
t
vld
dp
θτ
τ
θ += ++
+ ; 
( )2tt
t
t
t
d
dc
θτ
θ
τ += , ( )2tt
t
t
t
d
dc
θτ
τ
θ +−= . 
Optimizing the government's objective for tτ  we get: 
 ( ) ( ) 011 2
1
1
2 =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−+++−
−
−+
tt
t
tt
t
tt
tt
tt Z θτ
θ
θτ
ττθτ
ψθ γ
γα
. (19) 
Here  
( )1111111
11
)1()(1
1 ++++++
−
++
−−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−= ttttttttt
vlAE
vl
Z ϕδβϕϕβγ
α γγ
α
. 
In this setup the government's objective function is strictly increasing in tθ . However, there are 
constraints for increasing the fine rate. The situation can be modelled in the following way. 
Small fines are cheap to pay for the company and create little corruption opportunities for tax offi-
cer. However, with the fine rate rising, tax officer's incentives to take a bribe go up. We assume that 
tax officer takes a bribe and gets fires without any compensation for the government or further pun-
ishment for the tax officer. The firm is willing to pay the bribe of the amount up to its due payments 
when it gets caught. The tax officer knows that they will be fired in case of the bribe and cannot 
find further work. Time horizon of the officer is assumed to be 30 years. It is further assumed that 
the officer's annual salary growth is equal to the reverse of their time preference discount factor. 
Mathematically the setup looks in the following way: 
 tttt
r
t
t LWwS ))(1(
30
0
θτ +−=∑
=
. (20) 
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Here tS  is tax officer's net yearly salary. In the equation (11) above,  
r
t
t
r
t
tt w
LWLW = . 
Also, taking advantage of the condition derived above,  
( )25.0exp)(1 ttt trtw σθτ
ψ
+−= , 
we get the following condition: 
 
( )
t
tt
t
r
t
t
t
t
t
r
t
t
t
t
LW
S
LW
S
τ
ψσ
ψ
θ −
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
=
∑
∑
=
=
2
30
0
30
0
5.0exp
. (21) 
Considering the data from the sample at hand we get the average wage find of UAH 67,939 in the 
private sector in 2004 for the average number of employees of 87.13=rtL . That would correspond 
to the average wage of UAH 408.18, or, in the net terms, UAH 351.58=rtW . This corresponds to 
the average annual wage bill of UAH 13.87 351.58 12 58,517r rt tW L = × × =  of reported net wage per 
firm. We approximate tax officer's salary tS  to be the average public officer's salary, found in the 
official statistics for 2004 to be UAH 690.98, corresponding to the net income of UAH 580.11 a 
month. Averaging their age to be 40 years and life expectancy to be 30 years (18 years before the 
retirement and 12 — after with pension provision equal to wage), in UAH terms,  
30
0
580.11 12 215,800t
t
S
=
= × =∑ . 
Placing the data into the equation (12) we get the following condition: 
 2
3.69
3.69exp(0.5 )
t
t t
t tt
ψθ τ σ ψ+ = − . (22) 
This puts the equilibrium constraint of 58.2=+ ∞∞ τθ  at 52.1=ψ . 
5.3. Calibrating the model 
As a discounting factor, we take the interest rate at which the government can borrow abroad, which 
is 7% yearly. This corresponds to 935.0=β . The depreciation rate δ  is adopted from Beloded 
(2005) to be 085.0=δ .  
To evaluate the coefficients of α  and γ , and find tA , the equation was estimated  
)log()log()log()log()log( 0 ttt kptaAy γα +++= . 
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Here ty  is the GDP per unit of labour, tp  is budget expenditures less social expenses, and tk  is the 
capital stock in the economy. Then γαkpAy tt = , where ttt aAA ς+= −1 . 
For that purpose we estimated the model of the available monthly data for 1996–2001 of the follow-
ing specification: 
1 2 3 4
5 6 7
-1 -1 -1
log       log   log ,
      ,
1 .
12t t t t
Y K PC C t C C
WL WL WL
I C C R C Y
K K PPI Iδ
⎧ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + × + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎪⎪ = + +⎨⎪ ⎛ ⎞⎪ = − +⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎝ ⎠⎩
 
Here I  is investments, R  is average borrowing rate in the economy, PPI  is producer price index, 
WL  is the wage bill in the economy. Initial value for capital was taken from the National Bank's 
data series. The series of capital stock was constructed on the basis of 085.0=δ . Variables in the 
model appear in nominal terms. 
This specification allowed calculating: 
4 0.22Cα = = , 3 0.46Cγ = = , 2exp(12 ) 1.002a C= = , 0 1exp( ) 0.304A C= = . 
For estimation, however, we assume 0a =  with zero variance. 
For ttvl  we take geometric average of 1998–2004 growth of wage fund index in the economy. To 
correct for the lessening shadow sector, we divided each figure by the shadow sector contraction 
index. In the result, the growth of the wage bill is still high of 22.100 =vl . This is assumed to be the 
starting value of the parameter with its further approaching the economy's long-run growth rate as-
sumed to be 5%. 
Concerning parameters determining the tax officer's behaviour, and, correspondingly, the firm's re-
sponse, they are estimated taking considering the results of the short-rum model. For the data series 
of { }rr wW ,  and calculating for them { }τ,W , we can calculate  
)1)((
)5.0exp( 2 rw−+= θτ
ψσ . 
Here 626.02003 =θ , and setting 52.1=ψ  we get the average of the variance series of 54.02 =σ . 
Assuming the learning process to be 22 1 95.0 tt σσ =+ , we get 202 95.0 σσ tt = , where 54.020 =σ . 
5.4. Evaluation 
Now, putting the calibrated coefficients into the equation (10) we get a non-linear equation with one 
unknown, which is possible to solve numerically for { }tτ , from which it is possible to get all re-
maining required variables of { }tθ , { }rtw , { }tc , { }ty , { }tk , and { }tp . 
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The results of evaluation are represented in the figures below. Here the equilibrium taxation rate is 
equal to 0.730 (result after the 100th iteration) on top of the net wage, which is very close to the ac-
tual rate. Fine, however, goes to 1.85, which is about three times the current rate. 
In the equilibrium, the reported wage share tends to 0.41 of the total net wage paid and the probabil-
ity of being caught (audit effort) is 28.2%. 
The lines are dashed in the figures due to specifics of the solution algorithm in Matlab adapted (see 
Figs 11–13). 
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Fig. 10. Equilibrium path of tax and fine rates and reported share of wage 
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Fig. 11. Equilibrium path of tax and fine rates and reported share of wage 
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Fig. 12. Share of reported wage and probability of being caught equilibrium path 
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Fig. 13. Economic development variables equilibrium path 
The results obtained enable the conclusion that within the framework of existing structural ties in 
the economy it is possible to increase compliance by introducing a more severe punishment for eva-
sion. This is expected to be beneficial both for budget revenues and general economic development 
of the country. The existing tax rate is close to optimal and under the present conditions no other 
rate is expected to bring better results, taking into consideration the assumptions on the govern-
ment's objective function. 
Further improvements to the system might be developed by introducing structural changes into the 
economy which would break the assumptions laid into the basis of the model. 
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6. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION 
6.1. Testing the first hypothesis 
Testing the hypotheses econometrically, we apply the same assumptions made in simulating the 
numerical model, namely: 
1. The model is that firms operate both in the regular economy, as well, as in the shadow. Some 
of the employees are employed officially, and some of them are hidden labour. 
2. Employers are the only party responsible for paying labour taxes. Thus, firms' labour expendi-
tures per one labour unit consist of wage rate including personal income tax and social taxes 
paid above wage rate. 
3. The employee is interested in and bargains about only net wage they receive, which is assumed 
the only incentive for employment.  
These assumptions predetermine strictly dominating demand labour channel of tax system mecha-
nism. Quantitative analysis is applied to find out the cause-consequence relationship between tax 
rate and tax base of PIT.  
As we already stated in the numerical model, firms operate both in the regular economy as well as 
in the shadow, thus the cut in the tax rate may cause de-shadowing of employees' income (at least 
for high figures of wage), which may actually result in: (i) increase in an official wage rate and cor-
respondingly in the average official wage rate of an employee; (ii) increase in reported working 
hours (increase in total wage expenses); (iii) increase in both terms (no change in average wage rate 
but even more increase in wage fund); (iv) then, as underreporting wage is an attempt to decrease 
labour expenses, de-shadowing may also result in increasing labour/capital expenses ratio. In our 
analysis, we used change in average wage rate (d_wage_avi), in total wage fund (d_wag_fndi), and 
in ration of labour expenses to other expenses (d_wage_ratioi) as endogenous variables in alterna-
tive econometric specifications. We took change in an average effective tax rate d_piti calculated 
for each firm, as a policy variable.  
Also, it should be noted that the introducing flat low tax rate instead of the progressive high mar-
ginal tax rate might have several effects. As we cannot measure the share of underreported wage 
rate over the data sample, the problem is to distinguish between the tax change effect due to (i) the 
redistribution effect (labour became cheaper); (ii) and the de-shadowing effect. Thus, we make an 
assumption that the period under investigation is not long enough to make significant restructuring 
decisions but long enough to make decisions about tax reporting. 
The typical problem with this econometric specification is endogeneity between wage and PIT rate. 
Policy experiment implies exogenous shift in effective PIT rate, but magnitude of change is deter-
mined by former level of PIT rate. To test this problem, we regressed d_pit on d_wage_avi, 
d_wag_fndi, and d_wage_ratioi. From the results of testing (see Appendices), we conclude there is 
no pronounced problem of endogeneity over the data sample, so we can apply OLS estimation 
method. 
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Endogeneity problem is a reason that's why we fail to estimate the model also for 2002–2003 data 
to compare results. Change in PIT rate for 2003 is completely determined by change in tax base, 
and the problem of endogeneity can be overcome only with specific instruments like simultaneous 
equations. Besides, it is not reasonable to estimate such a model for 2002–2003, since the PIT rate 
change in 2003 is not systematic factor of de-shadowing, as in 2004, where it is the result of policy 
experiment. In words, we cannot find out comparable results of de-shadowing for 2003 and 2004. 
Quoting Vasilieva et al. (2003), 'taking into account different macroeconomic environment, it is not 
important to compare effects before and after reform, it is important to compare effects with and 
without reform'.  
It should be pointed out that there is a range of other factors, accept PIT rate change, affecting 
wage, which was discussed in details by Vasilieva et al. (2003). Authors studied the PIT reform in 
Russia analysing different effects that the tax rate change may have on a change in wages, including 
redistribution of income and de-shadowing. In particular, they tested the effect of the tax rate 
change on wage de-shadowing considering firms' costs structure, which is the analogous approach 
applied in the research proposed. They outlined several external factors that may cause a change in 
wages, and then accomplished a simulation based on a production function of Cobb–Douglas to es-
timate a percentage contribution to an increase in wages of each considered factor, which may ei-
ther strengthen or overweight any possible effect of the tax in the opposite direction. The factors 
outlined by Vasilieva et al. (2003) are the following: 
• labour productivity increase; 
• exogenous shift in labour demand; 
• redistributions funds from other taxes changes; 
• de-shadowing. 
To this list we may add as well 
• production scale increase.11 
Following Vasilieva's logics, we ignore first two factors. We accounted for a scale of production 
introducing a net revenues variable (d_rev_neti) into the econometric specification. Also, we ac-
counted for foreign capital participation introducing a dummy variable of  FDI (fdi_yes), consider-
ing this factor as a stimulus for discipline and accuracy in documentation.  
Testing the Hypothesis 1, we are interested in the sign and significance of the d_pit variable. Ac-
cording to the Hypothesis 1, we expect the coefficient to be negative and significant.  
Thus, we presented three alternative econometric specifications, estimated data in the first differ-
ences of the sample of 1 200 firms for 2003–2004 period (see Appendix A6): 
 d_wage_av = 1.396–0.036×d_pit+0.349×d_rev_net+0.0012×d_tax_col+0.139×fdi_yes; (23) 
  s.e.                               (0.195)                 (0.115)              (0.001)                   (0.293) 
                                                 
11 Loayza (1997). 
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d_wage_fnd = –9.60–0.0048×d_pit+0.004×d_rev_net+0.261×d_exp_dif–0.699×d_tax_col–8.27×fdi_yes; (24) 
s.e.                             (0.007)              (0.001)                (0.005)               (0.187)            (39.17) 
 d_wage_ratio = –0.203–1.53×d_pit+0.0006×d_rev_net–0.155×fdi_yes. (25) 
 s.e.                                     (1.502)               (0.0004)             (0.379) 
As we see, the sign is expectedly negative in all specifications, which implies negative impact of the 
tax rate on tax base evasion. However, the variable appeared significant only in the (23) specifica-
tion, and only slightly and not very meaningful. This result allows us rather to reject Hypothesis 1 
than to accept it. The de-shadowing effect is not pronounce for the whole sample of 1 200 firms. At 
most, PIT rate change provoked a little increase in official average wage rate, but failed to encour-
age some significant change in cost structure. This result follows the corresponding result obtained 
analytically from the theoretical model, where a cut in PIT rate provokes 1.7% increase in officially 
paid wage. 
Redistribution effect of other taxes also appeared not significant, that is the opposite result obtained 
by Russian experts. It is not strange, as other taxes were not reformed so dramatically as in Russia. 
In particular, social taxes were not changed, which had the most important impact in Russia. De-
spite of our expectations, foreign capital participation is not somehow influential factor for wage 
change. 
The literature on tax evasion argues that sensitivity of reported wages to a change in tax rates is de-
termined by technology in a particular industry and may vary greatly among industries. Industries 
that considered as sensitive to a tax rate change on labour income are the following: (i) labour-
intensive industries; (ii) industries with more productive less-skilled labour. Typically, these indus-
tries are services and agriculture. So, we re-estimated the most promising (23) specification with 
special dummies for industries, accounting for different the PIT rate change sensitivity across indus-
tries.  
d_wage_av = 1.404–0.026×d_pit+0.775×d_pit×ind_ag–0.550×d_pit×ind_ind–2.047×d_pit×ind_trd– 
 s.e.                               (0.012)                  (1.960)                        (1.642)                     (1.331) 
 –3.883×d_pit×ind_srv –1.642×d_pit×ind_est+0.003×d_rev_net+0.0012×d_tax_col+0.203×fdi_yes. (26) 
              (1.656)                    (1.656)                       (0.001)                  (0.001)              (0.303) 
Indeed, results of testing demonstrates comparatively larger response to PIT rate change in service 
and trade industries, which are more labour-intensive. Meanwhile, there is no effect in the agricul-
ture, where tax evasion is much easier in Ukraine. 
Some authors also argue that the sensitivity of a response to tax rate change may vary even inside 
one industry depending on some other characteristics of firms. We define them as property forms, 
regions, and size of firms, and we accounted for these factors introducing corresponding dum-
mies.  
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d_wage_av = 1.423–0.190×d_pit–0.182×d_pit×own_prv+1.603×d_pit×own_sta– 
s.e.                               (0.093)                   (0.227)                            (1.841) 
 –0.219×d_pit×own_col +0.003×d_rev_net+0.001×d_tax_col+0.138×fdi_yes. (27) 
                                   (1.374)                    (0.0001)                   (0.001)              (0.304) 
The PIT de-shadowing effect appeared significant for private firms and slightly significant for col-
lective firms, however, still not very meaningful. It is a logic result, since tax evasion is spread 
among firms of other ownership than state. 
d_wage_av = 1.401–0.617×d_pit+1.523×d_pit×reg_ct+0.349×d_pit×reg_es–0.624×d_pit×reg_st+ 
  s.e.                               (0.384)                 (1.539)                       (1.385)                     (1.612) 
 +3.765×d_pit×reg_w +0.349×d_rev_net+0.0012×d_tax_col+0.212×fdi_yes. (28) 
                                  (1.732)                     (0.115)                  (0.001)               (0.295) 
Regions hardly determine sensitivity of a response to the PIT rate change. 
d_wage_av = 1.414–0.020×d_pit–2.553×d_pit×siz_big+ 
                                    s.e.                               (0.010)                (1.375) 
 +0.349×d_rev_net+0.001×d_tax_col+0.183×fdi_yes. (29) 
                                                  (0.001)                 (0.001)             (0.293) 
The PIT de-shadowing effect appeared to be more pronouncing for big firms. At the first sight, it is 
quite surprising result, since tax evasion seems to be more important for small firms, which have 
larger part of labour expenses. However, with unchanged rate of social taxes, paying wages offi-
cially remains quite expensive for small firms; meanwhile, decreasing marginal PIT rate can be 
more significant for big firms, that traditionally hire high-skilled labour with relatively higher level 
of salary. 
Although the de-shadowing effect of the PIT reform appeared to be rather weak, almost negligible, 
for the whole sample of firms, sensitivity of response to the PIT rate change varies across industries 
and forms of ownership. Thus, private firms and firms with labour-intensive technology, like ser-
vices and trading, traditionally demonstrated a bit more increase in official average wages than oth-
ers. Size of firm is also determining factor of response significance.   
The estimation results, obtained for all specifications, appeared to be robust; but coefficients' values 
vary significantly across specifications. Thus, we are cautious to interpret numerical values and 
compare them with the corresponding ones, obtained analytically. 
6.2. Testing the second hypothesis 
To test the second hypothesis, we estimated cause-consequence relationships between the change in 
tax payments of firms for their employees (d_pit_col) and the average effective tax rate (d_pit). Fol-
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lowing Sinelnikov's (2003) methodology for testing a similar hypothesis, we regressed a change in 
the tax payments of firms (d_pit_col) on the effective tax rate (d_pit) and on the tax base 
(d_wag_fnd_cor). The estimated coefficient of d_pit is expected to be significant and positive if the 
Hypothesis 2 holds.  
But, as Sinelnikov (2003) noticed, a multicoleniarity problem may arise between tax rate and a tax 
base. As we cannot replace the base variable with some proxy, we tried to estimate just skipping the 
tax base variable. Since this dos not affect testing results significantly, we accepted the original 
specification. 
 d_pit_col = 24.61+2.65×d_pit+0.1309×d_wage_fnd. (30) 
 s.e.                           (0.444)                    (0.005) 
Both coefficients are significant (for the estimation output see Appendix A7), and even a d_pit coef-
ficient is quite influential. Since the PIT reform did not encourage any significant labour income de-
shadowing, a flat low PIT rate caused a considerable fall in PIT collections. This conclusion is also 
consistent with analytical testing Hypothesis II. 
d_pit_col = 23.69+4.15×d_pit–3.72×d_pit×ind_ag+2.83×d_pit×ind_ind–1.93×d_pit×ind_trd– 
 s.e.                            (0.723)            (10.52)                       (0.648)                      (0.602) 
 –1.55×d_pit×ind_srv–8.83×d_pit×ind_est+0.1313×d_wage_fnd. (31) 
                                           (0.669)                     (1.067)                       (0.005) 
Sensitivity of PIT collections to the reform varies across industries. The least fall is observed in ser-
vices and trading, where some de-shadowing effect is also observed. Meanwhile, industries with 
insignificant de-shadowing have the largest fall in PIT collections. 
d_pit_col = 16.07+6.52×d_pit–69.96×d_pit×own_prv+1.27×d_pit×own_sta– 
s.e.                             (2.215)              (66.53)                           (0.012) 
 –8.68×d_pit×own_col+0.14×d_wage_fnd. (32) 
                                                           (57.16)                     (0.004) 
The similar explanation is applied to a response of PIT collections across ownership forms. 
d_pit_col = 24.53+7.45×d_pit+83.73×d_pit×reg_ct+2.26×d_pit×reg_es– 
 s.e.                            (1.686)             (69.85)                       (62.86) 
 –16.95×d_pit×reg_st+3.67×d_pit×reg_w+0.1308×d_wage_fnd. (33) 
                                         (73.05)                     (78.64)                       (0.005) 
Region placement is not a decisive factor for PIT collection value. 
 d_pit_col = 18.16+5.13×d_pit+9.56×d_pit×six_big+0.1427×d_wage_fnd. (34) 
 s.e.                           (1.659)                 (0.596)                    (0.005) 
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The largest response of PIT collections is observed for big firms in comparison with small firms, 
despite of more pronouncing de-shadowing effect for big firms. Obviously, this de-shadowing ef-
fect is too small to compensate a harp decrease in marginal tax rate for big firms. 
6.3. Testing the third hypothesis 
The third hypothesis implies that a cut in effective tax rate allows firms to decrease their labour ex-
penses without changing either their tax obligations or employees' net wage rate. Having tested the 
first tow hypotheses, we conclude that a cut in PIT rate hardly affected official wage rate paid and 
reported by an employer, and caused a fall in PIT collections. Thus, a part of government's income 
will be redistributed to employers, if a net wage rate received by an employee remains unchanged in 
response to deceased effective PIT rate. In the other case, if net wage rate will increase in a re-
sponse to a cut in PIT rate, we have to reject the hypothesis and conclude that a loss in government 
income will redistributed to both an employer and an employee. 
 d_net_wage_av = –0.65–9.034×d_pit+0.732×d_wage_av+0.067×fdi_yes–0.00036×d_tax_col (35) 
  s.e.                                    (4.422)                (0.007)              (0.0743)            (0.00033). 
From the estimation output (Appendix A8), we conclude that after the PIT reform, PIT revenues 
was redistributed from the government to an employer, which allowed him to increase average net 
wage rate paid to his employee. 
d_net_wage_av = –0.63–9.51×d_pit+1.88×d_pit×ind_ag+0.61×d_pit×ind_ind+0.96×d_pit×ind_trd+ 
 s.e.                                   (4.635)              (0.493)                       (0.413)                    (0.335) 
 +1.20×d_pit×ind_srv–0.53×d_pit×ind_est+0.732×d_wage_av+0.072×fdi_yes–0.0004×d_tax_col; (36) 
               (0.417)                   (0.416)                 (0.007)                (0.076)            (0.00033) 
d_net_wage_av = –0.63–8.202×d_pit–0.564×d_pit×own_prv–2.775×d_pit×own_sta– 
 s.e.                                      (4.355)                  (0.393)                          (0.462) 
 –0.534×d_pit×own_col+0.732×d_wage_av+0.096×fdi_yes–0.00054×d_tax_col; (37) 
                            (0.345)                           (0.007)               (0.0763)              (0.00033) 
d_net_wage_av = –0.64–7.478×d_pit+1.741×d_pit×reg_ct+2.313×d_pit×reg_es+1.532×d_pit×reg_st+ 
 s.e.                                    (3.721)              (13.42)                    (3.365)                     (1.909) 
 +1.340×d_pit×reg_w+0.732×d_wage_av+0.03×fdi_yes–0.00039×d_tax_col; (38) 
                                (14.59)                     (0.007)               (0.0737)            (0.00033) 
d_net_wage_av = –0.64–8.824×d_pit–1.073×d_pit×siz_big+0.730×d_wage_av+ 
s.e.                                      (4.376)                  (0.349)                    (0.007) 
 +0.086×fdi_yes–0.00045×d_tax_col. (39) 
                                                          (0.0743)             (0.00034) 
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After additional testing, distinguishing among different firms' characteristics, we conclude that the 
largest increase in net wages received by employees occurred in firms with the largest response of 
PIT payments to the reform. This result confirms the previous conclusion that, following the PIT 
reform, the government tax income was redistributed to firms, after which was partly transformed 
into employees' income. 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The 2003 PIT reform stipulated for abolishing many exemptions and privileged group of taxpayers 
and instituting the flat tax rate of 13%. The government expected quite significant personal income 
de-shadowing as a result of the reform, which should compensate for the PIT revenues fall due to 
the tax rate cut. Unfortunately, the PIT revenues fell in 2004 for the first time since 1993, and the 
share of PIT revenues in the total tax collections also went down. It became obvious that reducing 
PIT rate, even so significantly, is not a panacea for PIT evasion and may lead to financial instability 
in the short-run. So, to design effective PIT policy, the nature of PIT evasion should be studied 
more carefully. Besides, the tax reform that is a natural experiment that represents a theoretical in-
terest and provides a good ground for researching the behavioural effects of the changes introduced. 
In the framework of the research, we developed a methodology, relevant to personal-income tax 
response analysis in the Ukrainian context. The research approach adopted involves constructing 
theoretical general equilibrium model adapted to practices in the Ukrainian economy. Empirical 
testing of the hypotheses on the micro company data that follows revealed the reform effects and 
confirmed adequacy of the theoretical model and validity of the assumptions adapted. 
Both analytical solution of the theoretical model and econometrician testing do not reveal any sig-
nificant de-shadowing effect of the PIT reform. This means that the reform did not stimulate any 
tangible structural changes in the economy. However, according to empirical investigations, private 
firms and firms with labour-intensive technology, such as services and trading, demonstrated a bit 
higher increase in official wages in a response to the change in the PIT rate than others. Meanwhile, 
another labour-intensive industry, agriculture, remained indifferent to the reform. Further reforms of 
the taxation system, including payments to social security funds, which make the biggest share in 
the burden of taxes levied on wages, might generate a different picture. Still, the effect of the further 
lessening is not convincingly positive. 
Further estimations confirm the second hypothesis that a decreased effective PIT rate provoked a 
considerable fall in PIT payments. The theoretical model showed that the PIT collections would 
have fallen by UAH 0.45 per employee per month in 2003 money if there had been no growth in the 
economy. Econometric estimation showed that in particular, this effect is larger for firms, which 
have no evidence for de-shadowing. However, big firms, in comparison with small firms, have 
more pronounced de-shadowing effect and simultaneously a larger fall in PIT payments. It follows, 
that lower marginal PIT rate can be more significant for big firms, which traditionally hire high-
skilled labour with relatively higher level of wages. At the same time, the effective PIT rate became 
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much lower for them after the reform, so their PIT payments decreased at a bigger extent than small 
firms' payments. 
As both theoretical modelling and econometrics revealed, the government's income in the form of 
PIT revenues was redistributed after the reform from the government to firms. Empirical part fur-
ther showed that this income re-distribution allowed firms to pay higher net wages to their employ-
ees. Those firms, which have more considerable reduction in their PIT payments, increased a net 
wage rate to a bigger extent.  
These effects of the reform, formalized by the econometric estimation, logically follow the predic-
tions of the theoretical model, where the weak result of the reform is predetermined by conditions 
of the dominating labour demand channel: (1) cost structure of firms with prevailing labour ex-
penses; (2) the labour tax burden is mainly levied on employers; (3) all responsibility for tax report-
ing and paying is levied on firms (due to this, employees are often not familiar with the relevant 
legislation); (4) there is no direct benefit from paying taxes (like those in the three-pillar pension 
system); (5) and, therefore, employees are hardly involved in firms' decision making whether to re-
port their wages, in particular, in industries with relatively effective low-skilled labour. Thus, em-
ployers' decisions are strictly bounded, while employees' role is minimized. In such conditions, 
without grounded structural reforms, the PIT reform of the current design failed to produce any sig-
nificant positive shift in the firms' incentive system, especially considering that the PIT constitutes a 
minor share of total labour expenses. 
The results we obtained from the analytical model enable us to make the conclusion that within the 
framework of existing structural ties in the economy it is possible to increase compliance by intro-
ducing a more severe punishment for evasion. This is expected to be beneficial both for budget 
revenues and general economic development of the country. The existing tax rate is close to optimal 
and under the present conditions no other rate is expected to bring better results, taking into consid-
eration the assumptions on the government's objective function. 
Under the results of the study the expected punishment and the low perceived probability of being 
caught evading are too low, which stipulates for the low observed tax compliance. The findings of 
the model show that audit efforts must be intensified by about 3-fold. 
Further improvements to the system might be developed by introducing structural changes into the 
economy which would break the assumptions laid into the basis of the study. Particularly:  
1. further reforming the PIT system (sharing tax reporting responsibility by both the employer 
and the employee); 
2. reforming the social security system (a single social tax rate and more tax burden on em-
ployees); 
3. reforming the pension system (introducing three-pillar system); 
4. reforming the financial market (with perspectives of individuals' private capital placement); 
5. more intensive labour policy for labour markets with relatively low labour skills. 
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Also, reforming tax system should include single social tax at a lower rate and transforming a part 
of the tax burden from the employer to the employee. But this makes sense if the pension and social 
security reforms are introduced; and reforming regulations in the labour market will allow decreas-
ing unemployment costs and increasing the influence of employees in contract negotiating with em-
ployers. Still, even introducing a single social tax of a lower rate, will be insufficient to encourage 
employers opt in favour of official jobs and wages without appropriate level of tax compliance en-
forcement. 
Other factors able to create incentives for firms to bring their employees' income out of the shadow 
are believed to be a lower level of corruption, a higher quality of public services and direct benefits 
from paying taxes (a close connection between social payments and social benefits). Generally, the 
importance is emphasised on further improving the tax system's transparency and simplicity, and 
appropriate compliance enforcement. Another important factor is developing institutional settings. 
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APPENDICES 
A1. The history of tax reform in Ukraine 
Actually, the history of the activities on de-shadowing and tax reform, in particular, as a rather en-
tangled one. The tax code, which passed its first reading in Parliament in July 2000 and its second 
in December 2001, at the end of 2002 still had many drawbacks, especially concerning taxation of 
small businesses and the administration of taxes. Still, the code stipulated cutting the value added 
tax from 20 percent to 17 percent and the profit tax from 30 percent to 25 percent. It also reduced 
the number of taxes, especially redundant local taxes. Autumn 2002 discussions pointed directions 
of its future improving. Final adoption of the code was then predicted to take place after the 2002 
parliamentary elections. 
So the talks on the new Tax Code (though there is no "old" one, and the legislation on taxation is 
a tricky mix of numerous legal acts and sub-acts, and explanations how to understand some 
norms) were conducted yet in late ninety's, but the legislative process on this issue was endlessly 
dragging on. 
Still, by now, the process of reforming the tax system has seen a great progress. It got its real start 
early in the year 2003 when the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted laws on lowering tax rates. 
According to them starting from 2004 personal income tax saw radical changes: instead of the pro-
gressive scale acting in the economy before there was a proportional system with the common rate 
of 13 percent introduced. Since 2007 the rate was adopted to be 15 percent and 5 percent will be 
withdrawn from deposit interest revenues. 
So, the question of affecting the shadow sector has been raised for long. Among the relevant actions 
of governmental policy the ones dominated which stipulated for decrease in the tax rates and tough-
ening tax administering. The most important actions of the government have been the following: 
1. Tax cuts introduced: 
• In 1995 the upper margin of the PIT rate was reduced from 50 to 40% and the minimum in-
come subject to it increased from 25 untaxed minimums to 100 ones; 
• In 1997–1999 additional payments for the wage fund to the social funds were gradually re-
duced from 52 to nearly 40%; 
• In 1999 the simplified system of taxing small businesses was introduces. The system allows 
for replacing several taxes and social funds subtractions by a single tax; 
• From 2004 the PIT rate is ad valorem of 13% to replace the previous progressive (0–40%, 
Figs 1–3) system. Corporate profit tax was also lowered to 25 percent since the start of 2004 down 
from 30 percent collected before. The PIT change mentioned was the most radical one. This made 
the tax burden significantly smaller especially for the wages exceeding the average one. 
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2. Program of de-shadowing adopted in 2001. It allows, among other things for reforming the sys-
tem of lax privileges, deregulating businesses' activities, regulating the financial system and ac-
tivities of governmental agencies, and intensification of monitoring enterprises' activities. A 
number of key decisions in execution of the program have not been implemented. 
3. In 1996–2003, a number of laws were adopted on development of the financial system of 
Ukraine. 
4. In July 2003, the Law on Mandatory Pension Insurance adopted. 
5. In July 2003, the Law on Mandatory Medical Insurance adopted in the second reading. 
6. In 2003, all anonymous accounts in banks closed. 
7. From January 1, 2007 the tax on deposits interests is going to be introduced of 5%. 
The essence of the 2004 tax reform is presented in the table below. 
2003 system 2004 system 
Total Labor Expenses Total Labor Expenses 
+Unemployment fund 1.9% +Unemployment fund 1.9% 
+Social Insurance 2.9% +Social Insurance 2.9% 
+Pension fund 32% +Pension fund 32% 
Gross wage Gross wage 
–Pension Fund 1–2% –Pension Fund 1–2% 
–Employment Fund 0.5–1% –Employment Fund 0.5–1% 
–Unemployment Fund 0.5% –Unemployment Fund 0.5% 
–PIT 0–40% –Tax Privilege 
Net wage PIT Base 
 –PIT 13% 
 +Tax Privilege 
 Net wage 
Tax on the wage fund did not change and made 36.8% in both years. In 2004 the thresholds for cal-
culating different Pension and Employment Fund Subtractions changed. Also a completely new no-
tion of the PIT base was introduces equal to Gross wage minus subtractions to social funds. 
The real tax load on net wage received by the employee was shown in Fig. 1. 
A2. Data sampling 
The criteria of representativity chosen were those of industry, region, and the form of ownership. 
The figures were calculated on the SSC report for the beginning of 2003 about the total number of 
the companies (registered) under the assumption of the proportion of really active companies to the 
total amount across all of the criteria listed in Appendix A2. 
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1. Industry. Different industries may differ in their reported wage rates. The arbitrage does not 
arise because of the rigidity or labour (especially qualified one) to shift among industries, and, also, 
possibly, the reported wage makes different part of the total wage received by employees across dif-
ferent industries. 
Industry Population data Proportion Sample data 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry; fishing 80155 9.6% 117 
Processing, extracting industries, utilities and energy production 
and distribution 103267 12.5% 150 
Wholesale and retail trade, trade of transport means; repairing 
services 246375 29.8% 358 
Real estate operations, lessor activities, and services for legal 
entities 88703 10.7% 129 
Collective, public, and personal services 106832 12.9% 155 
Others (each less than 7%), including: Construction; Hotel  
and catering business; Transport and communication; Financial 
activities; Public administration; Education; Healthcare  
and social welfare 200546 24.5% 291 
Totally 825878 100% 1200 
2. Region. Different regions of Ukraine represent different specialisations in terms of inherited 
business culture, natural resources available, industrial development, investment activity there, etc. 
According to the Ukrainian Constitution, its territory consists of 24 oblasts, one autonomous repub-
lic of the Crimea, and the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol. Still, considering all 27 regions in the work 
is not expedient, so on the criteria of similarities of culture, resources, industrial development, fi-
nancial flows intensity, there were 5 regions selected conventionally, each having its peculiarities: 
Region Population data Proportion Sample data 
South: Autonomous Republic Crimea, Mykolaiv, Odesa, 
Kherson, the city of Sevastopol 160867 17.2% 206 
Centre: Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, 
Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernivtsi, Chernihiv 190974 20.4% 245 
West: Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, 
Ternopil 134515 14.4% 173 
East: Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Luhansk, Kharkiv, 
Sumy 302033 32.3% 387 
The city of Kyiv 147189 15.7% 189 
Totally 935578 100% 1200 
3. The form of ownership. State and communal (actually, local authorities) property is managed in 
similar way. Still, they are of representative share each. Collective ownership includes, among oth-
ers the ownership of joint stock companies, limited liability societies and other companies (eco-
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nomic societies — under the Ukrainian law). For calculations here ownership by foreign legal enti-
ties is disregarded. 
Ownership of Population data Proportion Sample data 
State 66040 8.1% 97 
Communal 132045 16.1% 193 
Private 210266 25.7% 308 
Collective (ownership of economic societies, cooperatives, etc) 410976 50.2% 602 
Totally 819327 100% 1200 
4. Size. Also considered was the size of the companies. Ukrainian legislation distinguishes between 
small and large companies. The former are those not exceeding 50 people in the number of employ-
ees, and Euro 500 thousand in their turnover. They have the right to enjoy simplified taxation. 
Small companies are believed to engage more in tax evasion activities. So big companies (making a 
representative number in the sample) can be regarded as a control group. 
Size Population data Proportion Sample data 
Small companies 218500 88.3% 1059 
Big companies 28913 11.7% 141 
Totally 247413 100% 1200 
5. Participation of foreign capital. Companies, enjoying foreign direct investments, are believed to 
bear foreign culture (it can be a strong assumption for western investments) and so engage in the eva-
sion activities to a negligible extent. As far as the total number of companies with FDI does not make 
any representative share, their number taken for the sample is the minimum representative of 100. 
FDI availability Population data Proportion Sample data 
Companies with FDI  8.3% 100 
Purely domestic companies  91.7% 1100 
Totally  100% 1200 
A3. Creating data series 
The data obtained enable creating the following data series: 
Selection dummies 
1. Industrial dummies: 
a. IND_AGR: dummy for 'Agriculture, hunting and forestry; fishing': 117 companies; 
b. IND_IND: dummy for 'Processing, extracting industries, utilities and energy production and 
distribution': 150 companies; 
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c. IND_TRD: dummy for 'Wholesale and retail trade, trade of transport means; repairing ser-
vices': 358 companies; 
d. IND_EST: dummy for  'Real estate operations, lessor activities, and services for legal entities': 
129 companies; 
e. IND_SRV: dummy for  'Collective, public, and personal services: 155 companies; 
f. IND_OTH: dummy for Others (each less than 7%), including: 'Construction; Hotel and cater-
ing business; Transport and communication; Financial activities; Public administration; Educa-
tion; Healthcare and social welfare': 291 companies. 
Equivalences: 
_   _   _ _ _ _ 1200IND AGR IND IND IND TRD IND EST IND SRV IND OTH+ + + + + = . 
2. Regional dummies: 
a. REG_STH: dummy for South (Autonomous Republic Crimea, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kherson, the 
city of Sevastopol regions) : 206 companies; 
b. REG_CTR: dummy for Centre (Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Khmelnyt-
skyi, Cherkasy, Chernivtsi, Chernihiv regions) : 245 companies; 
c. REG_WST: dummy for West (Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil) : 
173 companies; 
d. REG_EST: dummy for East (Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Sumy 
regions) : 387 companies; 
e. REG_KYV: dummy for the city of Kyiv: 189 companies. 
Equivalences: 
_   _   _   _   _ 1200REG STH REG CTR REG WST REG EST REG KYV+ + + + = . 
3. Form of ownership dummies: 
a. OWN_STA: dummy for State ownership: 97 companies; 
b. OWN_COM: dummy for Communal ownership: 193 companies; 
c. OWN_PRV: dummy for Private ownership: 308 companies; 
d. OWN_COL: dummy for Collective ownership: 602 companies. 
Equivalences: 
_   _   _   _ 1200OWN STA OWN COM OWN PRV OWN COL+ + + = . 
4. Size dummies: 
a. SIZ_SML: dummy for Small companies: 1044 companies; 
b. SIZ_BIG: dummy for Big companies: 156 companies. 
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Equivalences: 
_   _ 1200SIZ SML SIZ BIG+ = . 
NB: some of the companies changed their status from large to big or vice versa in these 3 years. The 
data was compiled for the criteria of representativity corresponding to 2003. Notably, the number of 
small companies increased. That means that more companies chose reporting in the simplified way 
as regulated for small companies, as shown in the table below. 
Table 2. Dynamics of the sample companies size status 
2002 2003 2004 
Big companies Small companies Big companies Small companies Big companies Small companies 
174 1026 156 1044 139 1061 
Concerning size, the inconsistency of the data is that different reporting forms specify different 
status (the difference is observed, in particular, between the Entrepreneurship form and Income 
statement form. Balance notion of size is identical to that in the income statement). The size dummy 
defined corresponded to the reporting in the Income statement. 
5. Participation of foreign capital dummies: 
a. FDI_NOO: Purely domestic companies: 1100 companies; 
b. FDI_YES: Companies with FDI: 100 companies. 
Equivalences: 
_   _ 1200FDI NOO FDI YES+ = . 
Totally, there are 19 dummy variables, of which 5 are not independent. There are also 3 dummies 
for years (1 not independent). 
Income statement variables 
6. Revenues data: 
a. REV_GROS: gross revenues; 
b. TAX_IND: indirect taxes and other income related payments (for small companies) or come of 
value added tax, excise (for domestic and imported products) and other subtractions from reve-
nue (for big companies); 
c. PRF_GRS: gross profit (equal gross revenues minus indirect taxes and other subtractions from 
revenue). 
Equivalences: 
_ _   _REV GROS TAX IND PRF GRS− = . 
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7. PRF_OPR: operational profit (equal to gross profit plus other operational income minus opera-
tional expenses). 
8. PRF_FIN: financial profit (from all normal activity of the company). 
9. Income data: 
a. INC_GRS: gross income (equal to financial profit plus profit from extraordinary activities); 
b. TAX_CPT: corporate profit tax (imposed on gross income); 
c. INC_NET: net income (gross income minus corporate profit tax). 
Equivalences: 
_ _   _INC GRS TAX CPT INC NET− = . 
10. Elements of operational expenses: 
a. EXP_MAT: Material expenses; 
b. EXP_LAB: Expenses for labour (all expenses for labour equal to wage fund plus extra pay-
ments over wage fund); 
c. EXP_SOC: Social expenses; 
d. EXP_DEP: Depreciation; 
e. EXP_OTH: Other operational expenses. 
Totally, there are 13 variables obtained from income statement of companies, out of which 11 are 
independent. 
Balance sheet variables 
11. Fixed assets: 
a. INV_LON: long term financial investments at the end of period; 
b. DINV_LON: change of long term financial investments in the period; 
c. AST_FIX: fixed assets at the end of period; 
d. DAST_FIX: change of fixed assets in the period. 
12. Working capital: 
a. RES_BUD: receivables related to budget payments; 
b. DRES_BUD: change of receivables related to budget payments in the period; 
c. ACT_RES: accounts receivable totally at the end of period; 
d. DACT_RES: change of total accounts receivable in the period. 
13. Deferred costs: 
a. DEF_COS: deferred costs at the end of period; 
b. DDEF_COS: change of deferred costs in the period. 
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14. Balance: 
a. BAL_TOT: total balance at the end of period; 
b. DBAL_TOT: change of total balance in the period. 
15. Shareholders equity: 
a. CAP_STT: statutory capital at the end of period; 
b. DCAP_STT: change of statutory capital in the period; 
c. SHH_EQU: shareholders equity at the end of period; 
d. DCAP_STT: change of shareholders equity in the period. 
16. Reserve for deferred costs and payments: 
a. DEF_RES: reserve for deferred costs and payments at the end of period; 
b. DDEF_RES: change of reserve for deferred costs and payments in the period. 
17. Long term liabilities: 
a. LOA_LON: long-term bank loans at the end of period (long-term loans are available only for 
big companies); 
b. LOA_LON: change of long-term bank loans in the period (long-term loans are available only 
for big companies); 
c. LIA_LON: long-term liabilities at the end of period; 
d. DLIA_LON: change of long-term liabilities in the period. 
18. Current liabilities: 
a. LOA_SHR: short-term bank loans at the end of period; 
b. LOA_SHR: change of short-term bank loans in the period; 
c. LIA_SHR: short-term liabilities at the end of period; 
d. DLIA_SHR: change of short-term liabilities in the period. 
19. Deferred revenues: 
a. DEF_COS: deferred revenues at the end of period; 
b. DDEF_COS: change of deferred revenues in the period. 
Totally, there are 28 variables obtained from the balance sheet form. All of them are independent. 
Values for the start of the period can be obtained from values for the end of the period minus 
change of the figure in the period. 
Entrepreneurship form variables 
20. PRD_TOT: total amount of goods and services produced in the current prices (without VAT and 
excise). 
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21. EXP_PRD: expenses for production of goods and services (reference series, not all companies 
filled the values in the reporting form). 
22. TAX_COL: taxes, collections, obligatory payments (reference series, not all companies filled the 
values in the reporting form). 
23. Labour data: 
a. EMP_STF: annual average number of staff employees, people; 
b. EMP_FRL: annual average number free-lance employees (working on the contract basis or ex-
ternal employees combining jobs), people; 
c. EMP_UNP: number of unpaid workers (owners, founders, and their family members), people; 
d. EMP_HRS: worked by staff employees, person-hours; 
e. EMP_PRT: part-time workers (of staff). 
24. Wage data: 
a. WAG_FND: wage fund total; 
b. WAG_FRL: of wage fund for free-lances (counted by EMP_FRL); 
c. WAG_OTH: of wage fund for employees, who worked at other companies during the year. 
25. Investments data: 
a. INV_DUM: dummy for investments into fixed capital during the period; 
b. INV_FIX: total investments into fixed capital; 
c. INV_MAT: total investments into material assets; 
d. INV_NMT: total investments into non-material fixed capital. 
Equivalences: 
_ _   _INV FIX INV MAT INV NMT= + ; 
_   sign ( _ )INV DUM INV FIX= . 
26. FDI_INF: dummy showing whether foreign direct investments were obtained by the company 
by the moment of the end of the year. 
Totally, there are 16 variables obtained from the entrepreneurship form, out of which 2 are dum-
mies, 2 are dependent, and 2 are reference series (available for a sub-sample of companies). 
In the total, the data are described as the following: 
Table 3. Types of data series available 
 Dummies Of them selection dummies Other variables 
Totally 21 19 55 
Of them independent 15 14 52 
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A4. Data description and analysis 
Descriptive statistics for the data look in the following way. 
Table 4. The descriptive statistics of the micro data 
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IND_AGR 351 0 1        
IND_IND 450 0 1        
IND_TRD 1074 0 1        
IND_EST 387 0 1        
IND_SRV 465 0 1        
IND_OTH 873 0 1        
REG_STH 618 0 1        
REG_CTR 735 0 1        
REG_WST 519 0 1        
REG_EST 1161 0 1        
REG_KYV 567 0 1        
OWN_STA 291 0 1        
OWN_COM 579 0 1        
OWN_PRV 924 0 1        
OWN_COL 1806 0 1        
FDI_NOO 3300 0 1        
FDI_YES 300 0 1        
SIZ_SML 3131 0 1        
SIZ_BIG 469 0 1        
REV_GROS 3564 0 213347 370.60 166.6 15.57 1437.50 6602.96 18.585 1526.20
TAX_IND 2489 0 19901.6 211.73 14.15 12.35 199.40 865.28 0 229.09 
PRF_GRS 3564 0 213347 511.48 145.7 18.06 1238.09 5937.77 17.1 1299.8 
PRF_OPR 3489 –11836.2 212211.9 1586.30 5.8 35.01 412.39 4360.18 –19.43 289.81 
PRF_FIN 3473 –13382 212191.5 1601.16 5.6 35.18 406.72 4348.64 –17.53 280.105
INC_GRS 3446 –13382 12585.7 236.67 0.7 –3.11 –6.29 611.45 –25.615 35 
TAX_CPT 1305 0 6061.6 756.20 0 25.53 15.63 173.83 0 5.5 
INC_NET 3420 –13382 9446.5 267.66 0.3 –10.02 –21.92 554.33 –27.415 26.83 
EXP_MAT 2717 0 43845.6 243.65 8.4 13.69 309.85 1745.58 0 207.205
EXP_LAB 3520 0 26323.9 538.96 19.55 18.86 128.30 722.28 4.085 99.16 
EXP_SOC 3219 0 9729.3 509.47 3 18.72 39.82 273.64 0.2 22.915 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
49
 
N
on
-Z
er
o 
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
 
M
in
im
um
 
va
lu
e 
M
ax
im
um
 
va
lu
e 
K
ur
to
si
s 
M
ed
ia
n 
Sk
ew
ne
ss
 
M
ea
n 
St
an
da
rd
 
de
vi
at
io
n 
0.
15
 p
er
ce
nt
ile
 
0.
85
 p
er
ce
nt
ile
 
EXP_DEP 2671 0 7526.9 226.18 2.2 14.02 54.97 363.70 0 32.83 
EXP_OTH 3397 0 46465.7 649.26 18.7 22.48 193.85 1278.20 1.9 169.5 
INV_LON 225 0 35998.1 874.72 0 28.34 58.67 1061.17 0 0 
DINV_LON 103 –2383.5 30147.7 2869.86 0 51.51 11.93 532.37 0 0 
AST_FIX 3136 0 133126 251.73 24.2 14.37 1039.72 6325.24 0.3 539.515
DAST_FIX 2944 –23144 89429.7 1410.64 0 31.83 65.16 1912.01 –15.7 23.745 
RES_BUD 1813 0 6995.1 989.39 0.1 28.05 18.96 169.68 0 9 
DRES_BUD 2029 –1322.5 2330.7 239.23 0 8.31 2.63 88.61 –1.5 1.6 
ACT_RES 3518 0 67350.4 273.63 46.1 14.75 553.31 2721.95 3.4 533.095
DACT_RES 3488 –8139.1 50993.3 1174.88 0.9 28.02 74.21 1131.22 –28.215 70.845 
DEF_COS 997 0 1423.4 445.29 0 18.71 5.18 46.99 0 1 
DDEF_COS 1006 –2366.5 1417.3 911.88 0 –13.31 0.90 58.64 0 0.1 
BAL_TOT 3551 0 137305 156.93 111.55 11.30 1598.21 7714.21 10.285 1288.93
DBAL_TOT 3525 –23069 91395.1 813.35 1 23.62 140.27 2294.86 –43.515 117.73 
CAP_STT 2840 0 148635 471.81 10 19.74 703.67 5523.25 0 258.8 
DCAP_STT 588 –5554.8 10000 286.48 0 9.25 14.29 363.98 0 0 
SHH_EQU 3489 –11829 134334 266.03 31.65 14.85 957.84 6131.47 –2.015 537.405
DCAP_STT 3400 –23880 84162.4 1496.83 0 32.01 25.25 1774.55 –33.915 42.715 
DEF_RES 296 0 7917.6 952.84 0 26.91 14.98 188.54 0 0 
DDEF_RES 286 –2787 4471.1 757.40 0 15.39 2.11 122.32 0 0 
LOA_LON 32 0 18917.6 1842.12 0 40.25 13.71 378.09 0 0 
LOA_LON 37 –2384 10963 1580.20 0 37.46 7.08 238.79 0 0 
LIA_LON 378 0 23265.2 541.59 0 20.07 70.59 662.52 0 0 
DLIA_LON 366 –3246 15310.6 867.90 0 24.96 10.54 388.87 0 0 
LOA_SHR 311 0 15855 1373.52 0 31.81 34.10 337.43 0 0 
LOA_SHR 393 –3384.5 12673 1250.92 0 27.06 7.47 276.96 0 0 
LIA_SHR 3438 0 69654.2 209.53 32.2 12.81 549.09 2911.33 2.1 422.645
DLIA_SHR 3455 –11480 50823.9 611.31 0.9 21.07 99.77 1497.46 –23 70.315 
DEF_COS 103 0 6111.7 1732.98 0 38.58 5.71 124.07 0 0 
DDEF_COS 114 –286 6111.7 2804.15 0 51.23 2.60 108.77 0 0 
PRD_TOT 3593 –473.6 97678.9 218.35 101 12.89 871.67 4115.36 13.485 819.345
EXP_PRD 3102 0 99215.5 1274.89 55.45 30.72 361.95 2159.67 1.6 377.54 
TAX_COL 2714 0 1521.9 222.21 1.6 12.79 14.55 61.47 0 19.115 
EMP_STF 3490 0 3940 489.47 6 17.66 24.87 110.36 2 25 
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EMP_FRL 1453 0 316 734.30 0 21.02 2.00 7.86 0 3 
EMP_UNP 197 0 8 146.09 0 9.45 0.07 0.34 0 0 
EMP_HRS 3489 0 6133926 449.83 10868.5 16.78 41541.04 175698.6 2022.8 42436.2
EMP_PRT 919 0 956 788.40 0 25.89 2.68 25.92 0 2 
WAG_FND 3557 0 26323.9 505.52 19.8 18.34 129.05 736.14 4.185 100.73 
WAG_FRL 1441 0 1184.4 841.91 0 22.79 5.86 28.43 0 6.7 
WAG_OTH 98 0 48.4 368.44 0 17.45 0.16 1.73 0 0 
INV_DUM 1141 0 1 –1.38 0 0.79 0.32 0.47 0 1 
INV_FIX 1141 0 17866.1 459.32 0 19.16 74.90 611.40 0 25.215 
INV_MAT 1116 0 17861.1 474.07 0 19.46 73.28 604.11 0 24.145 
INV_NMT 139 0 2807 3307.79 0 56.57 1.30 47.78 0 0 
FDI_INF 3600 1 2 24.34 2 –5.13 1.97 0.18 2 2 
Data analysis 
Investigating the sample for outliers produces the following results. 
1. For the company 573 a dummy is needed. It is the ultimate outlier in many series (too big fig-
ures) and it is a small company, and its revenues go from 200 million in 2003 to zero in 2004. 
2. Company 929 might also need a dummy as in 2003 it paid CIT more than its income was and 
had great losses because of that. 
3. Company 322 paid 26 million in labour expenses (ultimate outlier) and had losses of 11 million 
in 2004 because of that. In 2002–2003 it paid 706 and 756 thousand in labour expenses. In 2003 it 
also had social expenses of 9.7 million and other similar figures (depreciation of 5.8 million against 
98 thousand in 2003). 
4. Company 323 is the major outlier in Long-term investment. They invested 30 million in 2002 
but their revenues are really low (less then a1 million). 
5. Companies 231, 251, 158 are outliers by the volume of fixed assets. 158 increased its fixed as-
sets in 2004 by 89 million. 
6. State debt to 110 is huge and rises in 2002–2004 from 3 to 70 million. 
7. 429 had a huge change in accounts receivable of 51 million. 
8. 231, 251, 229, 323, 151 and 158 are outliers by total balance and its change. 
9. 158, 231, 251, 323, 557, 929, and 973 are outliers by the amount of statutory capital or share-
holders' equity and their change. 
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10. 158, 473, 573 are outliers by deferred costs end-period volume and change. 
11. 5, 205, 653, and 929 are outliers by resources for deferred expenses and their change. 
12. 89, 158, 180, and 573 are outliers for long-term loans and liabilities. 
13. 180, 322, 323, 429, and 503 re outliers for short-term loans and liabilities. 
14. 231, 431, 802, and 888 are outliers for deferred costs. 
15. 322, 503, 929, and 573 are outliers by the volume of production. 
16. 146, 506, and 1035 are outliers by production expenses. 
17. 110, 172, 231, 688, and 866 are outliers by amount of taxes and other collections. 
18. 322 needs a dummy as it has 3940 employees in 2004 (up from 84 in 2002 and 54 in 2003). It 
also had 316 free-lance employees in 2004 (up from 16 and 12 in 2002 and 2003). 322 reported 
6.13 million person-hours in 2004, wage fund of 26.3 million and 1.2 million to free-lances. Other 
big companies (more than 1000 employees) are 180, 231, 888, 929, and 973. company 36 had 8 un-
paid employees in 2004. 
19. 172, 929, 950, and 973 employed in different years more than 200 part-time employees. 
20. 120, 322, 523, 607, 786, and 848 paid in different years more than 20 thousand to combining 
workers. 
21. 158 is the major outlier by investment in fixed assets. 123 is the outlier by investments into 
non-material fixed assets (2.8 million in 2003). 
To conclude, some dummies are required and some are desirable as able to influence the estimation 
results individually. 
Table 5. Dummies for outliers required 
Strongly recommended dummies 322, 573, 929 
Advisable dummies 5, 36, 89, 110, 120, 123, 146, 158, 172, 180, 205, 229, 231, 251, 323, 429, 473, 
506, 523, 557, 607, 653, 786, 848, 888, 950, 973, 1035 
A5. Programming short run model 
System 2003 
global t b tr br W Wbar p Teta Wtotal Wrold w_old; 
Wbar=420.09; p=0.126; Teta=0.5; Wrold=[]; w_old=[]; Wtotal=[]; 
RULE=[18, 0.368, 0; 77.38, 0.55455, –2.64273; 130.45, 0.64819, –9.80675; 145.35, 0.66829,–
9.92634;... 
    799.85, 0.77662, –25.67221; 1255.45, 1.04179, –237.76657; 1802.65, 1.4, –687.48; 100000, 
0.75439, 476.33614]; 
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for i=1:2501 
    W=(i–1); 
    n=1; %number of iterations for Wr, index of the current W in the RULE system 
    while W>=RULE(n,1), n=n+1; end 
    t=RULE(n,2); b=RULE(n,3); 
    for j=1:n %index of the current iteration for Wr 
        tr=RULE(j,2); br=RULE(j,3); 
        if n==1, MO=fminbnd(@objective,0,W); 
        elseif j==1, MO=fminbnd(@objective,0,RULE(j,1,1)); 
        elseif j==n, MO=fminbnd(@objective,RULE(j–1,1,1),W);   
        else MO=fminbnd(@objective,RULE(j–1,1,1),RULE(j,1,1)); end 
        A(j, :) = [MO, objective(MO)]; %matrix of minimums of objective 
    end 
    [Z,z] = min(A(:,2)); % z is the index of the minimum value of the objective in A 
    Wtotal(i)=W; Wrold(i)=A(z,1); 
end 
w_old=Wrold./Wtotal; 
figure; plot(Wtotal, w_old); xlabel('net wage, UAH') 
ylabel('reported wage share'); title('Share of the Reported Wage','FontSize',12) 
legend('2003'); set(gca,'XTick',0:125:W); grid on 
System 2004 
global t b tr br W Wbar p Teta Wtotal Wrnew w_new; 
Wbar=559.79; p=0.133; Teta=0.5; Wrnew=[]; w_new=[]; Wtotal=[]; 
RULE=[154.185, 0.60450, –14.83043; 317.266, 0.62105, –14.98332;... 
    437.4135, 0.62944, –15.06095; 2233.2, 0.62944, 0; 100000, 0.19111, 978.88]; 
for i=1:2501 
    W=(i–1); B=[]; 
    n=1; %number of iterations for Wr, index of the current W in the RULE system 
    while W>RULE(n,1), n=n+1; end 
    t=RULE(n,2); b=RULE(n,3); 
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    for j=1:n %index of the current iteration for Wr 
        tr=RULE(j,2); br=RULE(j,3); 
        if n==1, MO=fminbnd(@objective,0,W); 
        elseif j==1, MO=fminbnd(@objective,0,RULE(j,1)); 
        elseif j==n, MO=fminbnd(@objective,RULE(j–1,1),W);   
        else MO=fminbnd(@objective,RULE(j–1,1),RULE(j,1)); end 
        B(j, :) = [MO, objective(MO)]; 
end 
    [Z,z] = min(B(:,2)); Wtotal(i)=W; Wrnew(i)=B(z,1); 
end 
w_new=Wrnew./Wtotal; 
figure; plot(Wtotal, w_new); xlabel('net wage, UAH'); 
ylabel('reported wage share'); title('Share of the Reported Wage','FontSize',12) 
legend('2004'); set(gca,'XTick',0:125:W); grid on 
Objective Function 
function [out1] = objective(Wr) 
global t b tr br W Wbar p Teta Wtotal Wrold w_old Wrnew w_new; 
if nargin==0, Wr = 0:1:2500; end 
k=1+sign(Wbar–Wr); 
if W==0 
    out1=tr*Wr+br+(Teta+p)*(t*W+b–tr*Wr–br); 
else 
    out1=(tr*Wr+br)+(1–(1–(1–Wr/W)^2)^0.5)*0.5*(1+(1–(Wr/Wbar)^k)^0.5)*... 
        (Teta+p+Teta*p)*(t*W+b–tr*Wr–br); 
end 
A6. Programming long run model 
k=[]; Tau=[]; Theta=[]; p=[]; c=[]; y=[]; wr=[]; Phi=[]; 
Z=[]; A=[]; Xi=[]; Res=[]; VarUps=[]; 
global Theta t Alpha Gama Z Xi VarUps M p; 
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% calibration 
lv(1)=1.22; 
A0=0.304; a=1.000; A(1)=A0*a; 
Tau0=0.71; Theta0=0.633; 
VarUps0=0.56; VarUps(1)=0.81*0.95; 
Beta=0.935; Gama=0.46; Delta=0.085; 
Alpha=0.22; Xi=1.52; 
for t=1:20 
% intermediary coefficients 
    A(t+1)=A(t)*a; 
    VarUps(t+1)=VarUps(t)*0.95; 
    lv(t+1)=1/(6.88+t)+1.05; 
    Phi(t+1)=(Beta*A(t)*Gama/(lv(t+1)–... 
        Beta*(1–Delta)))^(1/(1–Gama)); 
    Z(t)=Alpha/(1–Gama)*(lv(t+1))^((1–Gama)/Alpha)... 
        *(Beta*A(t)*(Phi(t+1))^Gama–Phi(t+1)*lv(t+1)... 
        +Beta*(1–Delta)*Phi(t+1)); 
    Tau(t)=fzero(@olr1,1); 
    Theta(t)=M*Xi/(M*exp(0.5*VarUps(t))–Xi)–Tau(t); 
% streams of state and control variables 
    p(t+1)=(Tau(t)–Tau(t)/(Tau(t)+Theta(t)))/lv(t+1); 
    c(t)=Tau(t)/(Tau(t)+Theta(t)); 
    k(t+1)=Phi(t+1)*(p(t+1))^(Alpha/(1–Gama)); 
    y(t+1)=A(t+1)*(p(t+1))^Alpha*(k(t+1))^Gama; 
    wr(t)=1–Xi/(Tau(t)+Theta(t))/exp(0.5*VarUps(t)); 
end 
Objective Function 
function y = olr1(tau) 
global Theta t Alpha Gama Z Xi VarUps M; 
e=exp(0.5*VarUps(t)); 
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p=(Alpha+Gama–1)/(1–Gama); 
y=–1+Z(t)*(tau–1+tau*e/Xi–tau/M)^p*... 
    (1–(M*Xi–tau*M*e+tau*Xi)*(M*e–Xi)/M^2/Xi^2)+... 
    (M*Xi–tau*M*e+tau*Xi)*(M*e–Xi)/M^2/Xi 
A7. Testing hypothesis 1 
Dependent Variable: D_WAGE_AV. 
Method: Least Squares. 
Date: 01/15/06, Time: 18:24. 
Sample: 1 1200. 
Included observations: 1200. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 1.395936 0.194569 7.174503 0.0000 
D_REV_NET 0.349087 0.114776 3.041437 0.0024 
D_PIT –0.036180 0.021285 –1.699788 0.1045 
FDI_YES2 0.139140 0.292740 0.475302 0.6347 
D_TAX_COL 0.001218 0.001337 0.910805 0.3626 
R-squared 0.226356     Mean dependent var 0.591442 
Adjusted R-squared 0.223097     S.D. dependent var 2.824966 
S.E. of regression 2.792152     Akaike info criterion 4.895660 
Sum squared resid 9316.353     Schwarz criterion 4.916869 
Log likelihood –2932.396     F-statistic 18.08691 
Durbin–Watson stat 2.091257     Prob (F-statistic) 0.000002 
 
Dependent Variable: D_WAG_FND. 
Method: Least Squares. 
Date: 01/15/06, Time: 17:25. 
Sample: 1 1200. 
Included observations: 1200. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C –9.600259 26.03821 –0.368699 0.7124 
D_PIT –0.004829 0.006786 –0.711583 0.4769 
D_REV_NET 0.003510 0.001645 2.133787 0.0331 
D_EXP_DIF 0.261029 0.004834 53.99609 0.0000 
D_TAX_COL –0.699155 0.187362 –3.731577 0.0002 
FDI_YES2 –8.268711 39.16836 –0.211107 0.8328 
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R-squared 0.755862 Mean dependent var 41.70783 
Adjusted R-squared 0.754839 S.D. dependent var 754.3870 
S.E. of regression 373.5250 Akaike info criterion 14.68883 
Sum squared resid 1.67E+08 Schwarz criterion 14.71428 
Log likelihood –8807.301 F-statistic 739.3339 
Durbin–Watson stat 2.026193 Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Dependent Variable: D_WAGE_RATIO. 
Method: Least Squares. 
Date: 01/15/06, Time: 17:34. 
Sample: 1 1200. 
Included observations: 1200. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C –0.203455 0.252306 –0.806384 0.4202 
D_PIT –1.531167 1.502241 –1.019255 0.3083 
D_REV_NET 6.56E–06 1.48E–05 0.443406 0.6576 
FDI_YES2 –0.154479 0.379531 –0.407025 0.6841 
R-squared 0.001135     Mean dependent var 0.018276 
Adjusted R-squared –0.001371     S.D. dependent var 3.618346 
S.E. of regression 3.620826     Akaike info criterion 5.414609 
Sum squared resid 15680.01     Schwarz criterion 5.431576 
Log likelihood –3244.765     F-statistic 0.452854 
Durbin–Watson stat 1.966587     Prob (F-statistic) 0.715324 
 
Dependent Variable: D_WAGE_AV. 
Method: Least Squares. 
Date: 01/15/06, Time: 17:51. 
Sample: 1 1200. 
Included observations: 1200. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 1.404522 0.195132 7.197823 0.0000 
D_REV_NET 3.56E–05 1.15E–05 3.098275 0.0020 
D_PIT –0.025592 0.01263 –2.025811 0.0983 
D_PIT×IND_AG 0.774758 1.960142 0.395256 0.6927 
D_PIT×IND_IND –0.550211 1.642412 –0.335002 0.7377 
D_PIT×IND_TRD –2.047398 1.331312 –1.537880 0.1243 
D_PIT×IND_SRV –3.883412 1.655551 –2.345691 0.0192 
D_PIT×IND_EST –1.642274 1.655837 –0.991809 0.3215 
FDI_YES2 0.203242 0.303291 0.670121 0.5029 
D_TAX_COL 0.001241 0.001339 0.926841 0.3542 
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R-squared 0.132930     Mean dependent var 0.591442 
Adjusted R-squared 0.125616     S.D. dependent var 2.824966 
S.E. of regression 2.788549     Akaike info criterion 4.897218 
Sum squared resid 9253.444     Schwarz criterion 4.939635 
Log likelihood –2928.331     F-statistic 4.502384 
Durbin–Watson stat 2.095944     Prob (F-statistic) 0.000008 
 
Dependent Variable: D_WAGE_AV. 
Method: Least Squares. 
Date: 01/15/06, Time: 17:52. 
Sample: 1 1200. 
Included observations: 1200. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 1.423420 0.194791 7.307410 0.0000 
D_REV_NET 3.48E–05 1.15E–05 3.036551 0.0024 
D_PIT –0.190867 0.093734 –2.036205 0.1021 
D_PIT×OWN_PRV –0.182268 0.227489 –2.999122 0.0028 
D_PIT×OWN_STA 1.602640 1.841505 0.870288 0.3843 
D_PIT×OWN_COL –0.219293 1.373640 1.615630 0.1064 
FDI_YES2 0.138122 0.304603 0.453450 0.6503 
D_TAX_COL 0.001108 0.001339 0.827341 0.4082 
R-squared 0.133959     Mean dependent var 0.591442 
Adjusted R-squared 0.128285     S.D. dependent var 2.824966 
S.E. of regression 2.784727     Akaike info criterion 4.892821 
Sum squared resid 9243.605     Schwarz criterion 4.926755 
Log likelihood –2927.692     F-statistic 5.985927 
Durbin–Watson stat 2.105863     Prob (F-statistic) 0.000001 
 
Dependent Variable: D_WAGE_AV. 
Method: Least Squares. 
Date: 01/29/06, Time: 17:54. 
Sample: 1 1200 
Included observations: 1200. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 1.401216 0.194673 7.197785 0.0000 
D_REV_NET 3.54E–05 1.15E–05 3.083069 0.0021 
D_PIT –0.617302 0.384409 –1.605843 0.1019 
D_PIT×REG_CT 1.523773 1.538502 0.990426 0.3222 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D_PIT×REG_ES 0.349676 1.384927 0.252487 0.8007 
D_PIT×REG_ST –0.623852 1.612120 –0.386976 0.6988 
D_PIT×REG_W 3.765205 1.732014 2.173888 0.0299 
FDI_YES2 0.212716 0.294911 0.721289 0.4709 
D_TAX_COL 0.001240 0.001335 0.928320 0.3534 
R-squared 0.132493     Mean dependent var 0.591442 
Adjusted R-squared 0.125994     S.D. dependent var 2.824966 
S.E. of regression 2.788008     Akaike info criterion 4.896004 
Sum squared resid 9257.633     Schwarz criterion 4.934179 
Log likelihood –2928.602     F-statistic 4.999781 
Durbin–Watson stat 2.097347     Prob (F-statistic) 0.000004 
 
 
Dependent Variable: D_WAGE_AV. 
Method: Least Squares. 
Date: 01/29/06, Time: 18:10. 
Sample: 1 1200. 
Included observations: 1200. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 1.413747 0.194607 7.264617 0.0000 
D_REV_NET 3.43E–05 1.15E–05 2.988258 0.0029 
D_PIT –0.020282 0.010645 –1.905124 0.1099 
D_PIT×SIZ_BIG2 –2.552500 1.375474 –1.855724 0.0637 
FDI_YES2 0.183398 0.293412 0.625053 0.5321 
D_TAX_COL 0.001003 0.001341 0.747967 0.4546 
R-squared 0.129156     Mean dependent var 0.591442 
Adjusted R-squared 0.125090     S.D. dependent var 2.824966 
S.E. of regression 2.789301     Akaike info criterion 4.894447 
Sum squared resid 9289.560     Schwarz criterion 4.919897 
Log likelihood –2930.668     F-statistic 7.171502 
Durbin–Watson stat 2.086509     Prob (F-statistic) 0.000001 
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A8. Testing hypothesis 2 
Dependent Variable: D_PIT_COL. 
Method: Least Squares. 
Date: 01/18/06, Time: 18:44. 
Sample: 1 1200. 
Included observations: 1200. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 24.61318 8.802741 2.796082 0.0053 
D_PIT 2.6543 0.444375 5.973140 0.0000 
D_WAG_FND_COR 0.130936 0.005084 25.75482 0.0000 
R-squared 0.364085     Mean dependent var –18.12327 
Adjusted R-squared 0.363022     S.D. dependent var 158.4493 
S.E. of regression 126.4598     Akaike info criterion 12.52022 
Sum squared resid 19142511     Schwarz criterion 12.53295 
Log likelihood –7509.133     F-statistic 342.6633 
Durbin–Watson stat 2.006215     Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
 
Dependent Variable: D_PIT_COL. 
Method: Least Squares. 
Date: 01/18/06, Time: 18:30. 
Sample: 1 1200. 
Included observations: 1200. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 23.69040 8.647655 2.739517 0.0062 
D_PIT 4.015340 0.723680 5.548505 0.0000 
D_PIT×IND_AG –3.720214 10.51590 –0.353773 0.7236 
D_PIT×IND_IND 2.830401 0.648802 4.362569 0.0000 
D_PIT×IND_TRD –1.931293 0.602473 –3.205603 0.0014 
D_PIT×IND_SRV –1.548585 0.668614 –2.316109 0.0207 
D_PIT×IND_EST –8.825655 1.067109 –1.209186 0.2268 
D_WAG_FND_COR 0.131343 0.005003 26.25267 0.0000 
R-squared 0.393798     Mean dependent var –18.12327 
Adjusted R-squared 0.390238     S.D. dependent var 158.4493 
S.E. of regression 123.7287     Akaike info criterion 12.48070 
Sum squared resid 18248068     Schwarz criterion 12.51464 
Log likelihood –7480.422     F-statistic 110.6203 
Durbin–Watson stat 2.028232     Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Dependent Variable: D_PIT_COL. 
Method: Least Squares. 
Date: 01/18/06, Time: 18:34. 
Sample: 1 1200. 
Included observations: 1200. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 18.15946 7.999902 2.269960 0.0234 
D_PIT 5.126114 1.658742 3.090360 0.0020 
D_PIT×SIZ_BIG2 9.555679 0.596081 16.03083 0.0000 
D_WAG_FND_COR 0.142719 0.004673 30.54392 0.0000 
R-squared 0.476558     Mean dependent var –18.12327 
Adjusted R-squared 0.475245     S.D. dependent var 158.4493 
S.E. of regression 114.7806     Akaike info criterion 12.32725 
Sum squared resid 15756807     Schwarz criterion 12.34422 
Log likelihood –7392.350     F-statistic 362.9588 
Durbin–Watson stat 2.070715     Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Dependent Variable: D_PIT_COL. 
Method: Least Squares. 
Date: 01/18/06, Time: 18:35. 
Sample: 1 1200. 
Included observations: 1200. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 16.07398 8.292619 1.938348 0.0528 
D_PIT 6.521124 2.215212 2.943791 0.0033 
D_PIT×OWN_PRV –69.96490 66.53268 –1.051587 0.2932 
D_PIT×OWN_STA 1.277873 0.012426 10.28337 0.0000 
D_PIT×OWN_COL –8.675945 57.16796 –0.151762 0.8794 
D_WAG_FND_COR 0.140325 0.004828 29.06695 0.0000 
R-squared 0.441188     Mean dependent var –18.12327 
Adjusted R-squared 0.438847     S.D. dependent var 158.4493 
S.E. of regression 118.6945     Akaike info criterion 12.39597 
Sum squared resid 16821544     Schwarz criterion 12.42142 
Log likelihood –7431.583     F-statistic 188.5348 
Durbin–Watson stat 2.047428     Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Dependent Variable: D_PIT_COL. 
Method: Least Squares. 
Date: 01/18/06, Time: 21:10. 
Sample: 1 1200. 
Included observations: 1200. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 24.53673 8.823746 2.780762 0.0055 
D_PIT 7.448580 1.686316 4.417076 0.0000 
D_PIT×REG_CT 83.72973 69.84753 1.198750 0.2309 
D_PIT×REG_ES 2.256270 62.86475 0.035891 0.9714 
D_PIT×REG_ST –16.95431 73.05485 –0.232076 0.8165 
D_PIT×REG_W 3.669871 78.64327 0.046665 0.9628 
D_WAG_FND_COR 0.130841 0.005109 25.60999 0.0000 
R-squared 0.365445     Mean dependent var –18.12327 
Adjusted R-squared 0.362254     S.D. dependent var 158.4493 
S.E. of regression 126.5360     Akaike info criterion 12.52475 
Sum squared resid 19101559     Schwarz criterion 12.55444 
Log likelihood –7507.848     F-statistic 114.5098 
Durbin–Watson stat 2.003696     Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
A9. Testing hypothesis 3 
Dependent Variable: D_NET_WAGE_AV. 
Method: Least Squares. 
Date: 01/24/06, Time: 22:26. 
Sample: 1 1200. 
Included observations: 1200. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C –0.649649 0.050470 –12.87193 0.0000 
D_PIT –9.034262 4.422167 –2.042949 0.0935 
D_WAGE_AV 0.731657 0.007319 99.96718 0.0000 
FDI_YES2 0.066822 0.074351 0.898731 0.3690 
D_TAX_COL –0.000361 0.000338 –1.070192 0.2847 
R-squared 0.896174     Mean dependent var 1.171969 
Adjusted R-squared 0.895826     S.D. dependent var 2.197192 
S.E. of regression 0.709165     Akaike info criterion 2.154702 
Sum squared resid 600.9839     Schwarz criterion 2.175910 
Log likelihood –1287.821     F-statistic 2578.651 
Durbin–Watson stat 1.973510     Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Dependent Variable: D_NET_WAGE_AV. 
Method: Least Squares. 
Date: 01/24/06, Time: 15:28. 
Sample: 1 1200. 
Included observations: 1200. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C –0.640456 0.050381 –12.71219 0.0000 
D_PIT –8.824470 4.376088 –2.016529 0.0851 
D_PIT×SIZ_BIG2 –1.072960 0.348870 –3.075526 0.0021 
D_WAGE_AV 0.730399 0.007305 99.99078 0.0000 
FDI_YES2 0.085513 0.074338 1.150328 0.2502 
D_TAX_COL –0.000453 0.000338 –1.341147 0.1801 
R-squared 0.896990     Mean dependent var 1.171969 
Adjusted R-squared 0.896558     S.D. dependent var 2.197192 
S.E. of regression 0.706669     Akaike info criterion 2.148478 
Sum squared resid 596.2604     Schwarz criterion 2.173928 
Log likelihood –1283.087     F-statistic 2079.415 
Durbin–Watson stat 1.981749     Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Dependent Variable: D_NET_WAGE_AV. 
Method: Least Squares. 
Date: 01/24/06, Time: 22:30. 
Sample: 1 1200. 
Included observations: 1200. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C –0.629653 0.050128 –12.56085 0.0000 
D_PIT –9.513967 4.635529 –2.051918 0.0842 
D_PIT×IND_AG 1.879908 0.492966 3.813460 0.0001 
D_PIT×IND_IND 0.608641 0.413022 1.473628 0.1408 
D_PIT×IND_TRD 0.957737 0.334597 2.862356 0.0043 
D_PIT×IND_SRV 1.202352 0.417269 2.881475 0.0040 
D_PIT×IND_EST –0.532873 0.416472 –1.279494 0.2010 
D_WAGE_AV 0.732232 0.007261 100.8475 0.0000 
FDI_YES2 0.072099 0.076267 0.945350 0.3447 
D_TAX_COL –0.000414 0.000335 –1.234034 0.2174 
R-squared 0.898900     Mean dependent var 1.171969 
Adjusted R-squared 0.898135     S.D. dependent var 2.197192 
S.E. of regression 0.701261     Akaike info criterion 2.136425 
Sum squared resid 585.2023     Schwarz criterion 2.178842 
Log likelihood –1271.855     F-statistic 1175.615 
Durbin–Watson stat 1.969337     Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Dependent Variable: D_NET_WAGE_AV. 
Method: Least Squares. 
Date: 01/29/06, Time: 22:31. 
Sample: 1 1200. 
Included observations: 1200. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C –0.628310 0.049930 –12.58373 0.0000 
D_PIT –8.201779 4.354562 –1.883489 0.0612 
D_PIT×OWN_PRV –0.564409 0.392971 –1.436260 0.1512 
D_PIT×OWN_STA –2.774992 0.461749 –6.009746 0.0000 
D_PIT×OWN_COL –0.533660 0.344788 –1.547791 0.1219 
D_WAGE_AV 0.731697 0.007236 101.1258 0.0000 
FDI_YES2 0.096381 0.076367 1.262078 0.2072 
D_TAX_COL –0.000542 0.000334 –1.621941 0.1051 
R-squared 0.899574     Mean dependent var 1.171969 
Adjusted R-squared 0.898984     S.D. dependent var 2.197192 
S.E. of regression 0.698334     Akaike info criterion 2.126407 
Sum squared resid 581.3036     Schwarz criterion 2.160341 
Log likelihood –1267.844     F-statistic 1525.342 
Durbin–Watson stat 1.987596     Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Dependent Variable: D_NET_WAGE_AV. 
Method: Least Squares. 
Date: 01/29/06, Time: 22:32. 
Sample: 1 1200. 
Included observations: 1200. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C –0.635032 0.049719 –12.77236 0.0000 
D_PIT –7.47750 3.721193 –2.009436 0.0536 
D_PIT×REG_CT 1.741679 13.41583 0.129822 0.8561 
D_PIT×REG_ES 2.313040 3.364911 0.687408 0.3325 
D_PIT×REG_ST 1.531874 1.909583 0.802203 0.1258 
D_PIT×REG_W 1.340557 14.59220 0.091868 0.9581 
D_WAGE_AV 0.731548 0.007216 101.3771 0.0000 
FDI_YES2 0.029558 0.073742 0.400830 0.6886 
D_TAX_COL –0.000387 0.000332 –1.165071 0.2442 
R-squared 0.900020     Mean dependent var 1.171969 
Adjusted R-squared 0.899348     S.D. dependent var 2.197192 
S.E. of regression 0.697074     Akaike info criterion 2.123622 
Sum squared resid 578.7220     Schwarz criterion 2.161798 
Log likelihood –1265.173     F-statistic 1340.168 
Durbin–Watson stat 2.000495     Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
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